Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Leading Seaman C.D. Edwards, et al. v. His Majesty the King (39820)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal.This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103. Argued Date 2023-10-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) . Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Leading Seaman C.D. Edwards, et al. v. His Majesty the King (39820)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal.This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103. Argued Date 2023-10-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) . Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

City of St. John’s v. Wallace Lynch, et al. (40302)

In 1991, Newfoundland and Labrador reorganized its northeast Avalon municipalities, expanding St. John’s boundaries and triggering a new planning process for St. John’s. The Lynch property and others were zoned as “watershed” because they fall within the Broad Cove River Watershed, which feeds St. John’s municipal water supply. In 2011, the Lynches asked the City what sort of residential, agricultural, forestry or public utility uses the property could be put to. They were informed verbally that no development would be permitted. They then applied to develop a ten-lot residential subdivision. In a letter dated February 1, 2013, the City Manager rejected their application as being contrary to ss. 104 and 106 of the City of St. John’s Act and the development regulations which established the watershed zoning.The municipal water supply had been subject to statutory protection through limits on development since before the Crown Grant in 1917. In 1959, the City of St. John’s Act was amended to add the Broad Cove Watershed to the area within St. John’s control, even though it was not within the city itself. As a result, the Lynch property was subject to St. John’s pollution control and its powers of expropriation, and its use and development were restricted. Residential building was not expressly prohibited until 1964, when St. John’s amended the City of St. John’s Act to prohibit the erection of most buildings in the controlled area unless they were associated with existing private family dwellings. In 1978, these restrictions were softened to allow the City Manager to grant permission to build on the land. In 1992, St. John’s boundaries were expanded to include the Lynch property, so St. John’s general land use zoning applied to the property. The watershed zoning came into effect in 1994, and the resulting management plan, which included keeping St. John’s watersheds “as pristine as possible”, was adopted in 1996.The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the City Manager’s decision to prevent any development in any manner, set out in the February 1, 2013, letter, constituted constructive expropriation: Lynch v. St. John’s (City), 2016 NLCA 35, at paras. 66-67 (“Expropriation Decision”). The Court of Appeal remitted the issue of compensation to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities. In the course of determining compensation, the Board referred the following question to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador under the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. E-19, s. 26(3), by special case:Whether the Lynches’ compensation should be assessed based on the uses permitted by the existing zoning, which are agriculture, forestry and public utility uses, or whether the existing zoning should be ignored and the value determined as if residential development were permissible.The applications judge granted compensation for constructive expropriation of property based on existing watershed zoning. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering that compensation be determined without reference to watershed zoning. Argued Date 2023-11-16 Keywords Expropriation - Expropriation — Constructive expropriation — Compensation — Causation — How compensation for constructive expropriation should be assessed — Proper causation analysis for determining loss to landowner — Pointe Gourde principle — Whether regulations sufficiently linked to expropriation of property to justify application of Pointe Gourde principle. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ummugulsum Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, et al. (40348)

Appellant Ummugulsum Yatar was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ms. Yatar applied to her insurer, TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (hereafter, “TD”) for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits, as well as income replacement benefits (IRB). TD initially paid those benefits.About a year later, following insurance medical examinations, TD denied Ms. Yatar’s claim for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits. Several months after that, TD denied her IRB claim. Ms. Yatar brought an application before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) to challenge the denial of her insurance benefits claim. The application was dismissed. She requested a reconsideration of the LAT decision, which was also dismissed.Ms. Yatar then brought an appeal on questions of law and an application for judicial review of the LAT reconsideration decision before the Divisional Court. The court dismissed both the appeal and the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Yatar’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision. Argued Date 2023-11-15 Keywords Administrative law - Boards and tribunals, Appeals, Judicial review - Administrative law — Boards and tribunals — Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) — Appeals — Judicial review — Appellant injured in motor vehicle accident, insurer denying claim for benefits — LAT dismissing appellant’s benefits claim — Appellant simultaneously appealing on questions of law and seeking judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the legislature’s decision to limit the right of appeal to pure questions of law restricted the availability of judicial review concerning other questions to rare or unusual cases — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable — Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G — Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 — Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Eurobank Ergasias S.A., et al. v. Bombardier inc., et al. (40350)

Bombardier inc. entered into a procurement contract with the respondent branch of the Greek government (HMOD) for ten firefighting amphibious aircraft. There was also an Offsets contract by which Bombardier committed to offset programs inviting Greek suppliers as subcontractors for the work, for a total credited value of 110% of the main contract. Bombardier was to pay up to 10% of this amount as liquidated damages if the Offsets contract was not fulfilled, which was secured by a letter of guarantee with the appellant. Bombardier arranged a corresponding letter of counter-guarantee issued by National Bank of Canada in favour of the appellant.A dispute arose under the Offsets contract. Bombardier filed a request for arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. It later amended its request to include the issue of whether the Offsets contract was null and void for violating the principle of the free movement of goods under the laws of the European Union. Although at one point HMOD made an undertaking not to seek payment under the letter of guarantee while arbitration was pending, it later demanded payment of the US $13,868,354 from the appellant under the letter of guarantee. Bombardier sought and received interim injunctions against payment from Quebec courts and through an Interim Order of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal, and the appellant obtained an interim injunction from a Greek court. When a further injunction was denied by a Greek court, and with the imminent release of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Award, HMOD served the appellant with an Extrajudicial Invitation Protest, ordering it, under penalty of law, to make payment under the letter of guarantee. Shortly after the appellant paid HMOD, the Final Award of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal was released, ruling that the Offsets Contract, including its terms pertaining to the liquidated damages and to a letter of guarantee, violated EU law and was null and void ab initio. When National Bank refused payment to the appellant under the letter of counter-guarantee, the appellant sought recovery through the courts of Quebec.The Superior Court of Quebec confirmed its jurisdiction and rejected the appellant’s demand for payment under the letter of counter-guarantee on the basis of the fraud exception. It held that the letter of counter-guarantee was unenforceable and enjoined National Bank from paying pursuant to it. The court homologated the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Final Award and ordered the HMOD to comply with it. The Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court decision, except to strike out that part of the trial judgment ordering HMOD to comply with the Final Arbitral Award. Argued Date 2023-11-14 Keywords Commercial law - Commercial law — Banks and banking operations — Letters of credit — Bank’s obligation to pay on presentation of letter of guarantee and counter-guarantee — Fraud exception — Scope and availability of exception — Jurisdiction of Quebec courts — What are the proper limits to the fraud exception to the autonomous nature of letters of credit — Could the Quebec courts rule that the appellant’s conduct amounted to bad faith when it abided by the judgments rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction — How is risk to be apportioned between the parties to a complex commercial transaction scheme utilizing letters of credit — Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R 59. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Ontario, et al. v. Mike Restoule, Patsy Corbiere, Duke Peltier, Peter Recollet, Dean Sayers and Roger Daybutch, on their own behalf and on behalf of all... (Day 2/2) (40024)

In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since.The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-08 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. His Majesty the King (40276)

A corporate taxpayer requested that the Minister of National Revenue exercise her discretionary power under s. 247(10) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”) to adjust the value of a non-arm’s length transaction downward, which would, in turn, reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s assessment. The Minister declined to do so. The taxpayer wished to challenge the Minister’s decision, but it was unclear whether the Tax Court or Federal Court had jurisdiction to do so. The parties put a stated question to the Tax Court to determine the jurisdictional issue: Where the Minister of National Revenue has exercised her discretion pursuant to s. 247(10) of the ITA to deny a taxpayer’s request for a downward transfer pricing adjustment, is that a decision falling outside the exclusive original jurisdiction granted to the Tax Court of Canada under s. 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 and s. 171 of the ITA?The Tax Court judge determined that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision. She held that the decision directly affected the computation of income, and was therefore part of the assessment. Appeals of assessments are within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.The Federal Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion and allowed the Crown’s appeal. The decision is part of the process of the assessment, and the Tax Court only has the power to hear appeals of the product of that process. Furthermore, correcting an error in the Minister’s decision requires a power to quash or issue an order of mandamus, and the Tax Court does not have those powers. Argued Date 2023-11-09 Keywords Courts - Jurisdiction, Income tax - Courts —Jurisdiction — Income tax — Whether review of exercise of Minister’s power under subsection 247(10) of Income Tax Act is within Tax Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Ontario, et al. v. Mike Restoule, Patsy Corbiere, Duke Peltier, Peter Recollet, Dean Sayers and Roger Daybutch, on their own behalf and on behalf of all Members of the... (40024)

In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since.The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-07 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

York Region District School Board v. Elementary Teachers’ Federation of Ontario (40360)

The private communications of two teachers, recorded on their personal, password-protected log were read and captured by screenshots taken by their school principal, and then used by the respondent school board (“Board”) to discipline them. The union filed a grievance against the written reprimand issued to the teachers (“Grievors”) claiming the Board violated the Grievors right to privacy by assessing private digital information without reasonable cause and using that information as the basis for an investigation that led to the discipline.By the time the grievance was heard, the written reprimands had been removed from the Grievors’ records. But the parties agreed to move forward with the issue of the alleged breach of the right to privacy.The arbitrator dismissed the grievance against the Board. The majority of the Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the award of the arbitrator. Argued Date 2023-10-18 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Charter of Rights — Unreasonable search and seizure — Reasonable expectation of privacy — Private communications of teachers captured by screenshots taken by school principal and used for discipline purposes — What standard of review applies to labour arbitrator’s decision adjudicating employee’s privacy claim — Whether Charter applies to school boards — Scope and content of employee’s privacy rights in workplace, either under s. 8 of Charter or common law. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Don Johnson v. His Majesty the King (40330)

The appellant, Don Johnson, was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder by a jury. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed his appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to leave party liability with the jury. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In his view, there was an insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave the route of party liability with the jury, as there was no air of reality to the suggestion that, if the appellant was not the shooter, he aided the actual shooter in the commission of the murders. The instructions were also inadequate, as the trial judge did not adequately set out the requirements that had to be met to prove that route. Argued Date 2023-10-13 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that party liability was properly left to the jury as a route to conviction? — In the alternative, did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on party liability were adequate?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).