Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Dorinela Pepa v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (40840)

Section 63(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) provides foreign nationals who hold a permanent resident visa with the right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) against a decision to make a removal order against them made under s. 44(2) or made at an admissibility hearing.In March 2018, the appellant, Dorinela Pepa, came to Canada while in possession of a permanent resident visa as an accompanying dependent child of her father. However, before she came to Canada, Ms. Pepa married. On her arrival in Canada, she advised the point of entry officer of her marriage. Because of the change in her circumstances, Ms. Pepa was admitted for further examination and was not landed. The further examination occurred in the next month, followed by two reports under s. 44 of the IRPA. An admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division (“ID”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board commenced in September 2018. Her visa had expired earlier that month. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ID issued an exclusion order against her. She appealed the decision to the IAD, but the IAD concluded that she had no right to appeal under s. 63(2) because, when the removal order was issued, her visa had expired and so was no longer valid. Ms. Pepa’s application to the Federal Court and appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal were dismissed, with those courts concluding that the IAD’s decision was reasonable. Argued Date 2024-12-04 Keywords Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division – Permanent resident visa expiring after its holder arrived in Canada without being landed but before removal order issued — Visa holder appealing to Immigration Appeal Division — Immigration Appeal Division interpreting statutory provision at issue as not conferring it jurisdiction — Application for judicial review to Federal Court and appeal to Federal Court of Appeal dismissed on basis that interpretation by Immigration Appeal Division was reasonable — What is the appropriate standard of review to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Division regarding the statutory right of appeal under statutory provision at issue? — Whether the Immigration Appeal Division erred in construing statutory provision at issue by determining that the appellant lost her right of appeal because the validity date of her permanent resident visa had passed prior to the issuance of the exclusion order — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 63(2). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Dorinela Pepa v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (40840)

Section 63(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) provides foreign nationals who hold a permanent resident visa with the right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) against a decision to make a removal order against them made under s. 44(2) or made at an admissibility hearing.In March 2018, the appellant, Dorinela Pepa, came to Canada while in possession of a permanent resident visa as an accompanying dependent child of her father. However, before she came to Canada, Ms. Pepa married. On her arrival in Canada, she advised the point of entry officer of her marriage. Because of the change in her circumstances, Ms. Pepa was admitted for further examination and was not landed. The further examination occurred in the next month, followed by two reports under s. 44 of the IRPA. An admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division (“ID”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board commenced in September 2018. Her visa had expired earlier that month. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ID issued an exclusion order against her. She appealed the decision to the IAD, but the IAD concluded that she had no right to appeal under s. 63(2) because, when the removal order was issued, her visa had expired and so was no longer valid. Ms. Pepa’s application to the Federal Court and appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal were dismissed, with those courts concluding that the IAD’s decision was reasonable. Argued Date 2024-12-04 Keywords Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division – Permanent resident visa expiring after its holder arrived in Canada without being landed but before removal order issued — Visa holder appealing to Immigration Appeal Division — Immigration Appeal Division interpreting statutory provision at issue as not conferring it jurisdiction — Application for judicial review to Federal Court and appeal to Federal Court of Appeal dismissed on basis that interpretation by Immigration Appeal Division was reasonable — What is the appropriate standard of review to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Division regarding the statutory right of appeal under statutory provision at issue? — Whether the Immigration Appeal Division erred in construing statutory provision at issue by determining that the appellant lost her right of appeal because the validity date of her permanent resident visa had passed prior to the issuance of the exclusion order — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 63(2). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Thomas Stevenson v. His Majesty the King (41269)

Two people robbed a restaurant with their faces completely covered. The incident was captured on security cameras. The crime remained unsolved for several years until an unsavoury third-party witness implicated the appellant as one of the robbers. The appellant was charged with robbery and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence under the Criminal Code. The appellant elected to be tried by a provincial court judge.The sole issue at trial was the appellant’s identity, and the Crown’s evidence on that element was limited to evidence of the unsavoury witness. The trial judge determined that the witness was able to provide recognition evidence. The witness then testified to multiple ways he was able to identify the appellant in the video despite his face being covered. The trial judge accepted the witness’s evidence and concluded that some of the evidence at trial corroborated his testimony. The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery and having his face masked while committing an indictable offence.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal from his conviction and affirmed the conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that there was no error in the trial judge’s application of Vetrovec. The trial judge recognized the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness’s evidence and provided reasons that explained how those challenges were resolved. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge had erred in the treatment of the evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness. The trial judge’s Vetrovec errors were errors of law that warranted appellate intervention. Argued Date 2024-11-08 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Assessment —Unsavoury Crown witnesses — Sufficiency of Vetrovec scrutiny — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s reliance on the identification evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s application of the principles set out in Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Thomas Stevenson v. His Majesty the King (41269)

Two people robbed a restaurant with their faces completely covered. The incident was captured on security cameras. The crime remained unsolved for several years until an unsavoury third-party witness implicated the appellant as one of the robbers. The appellant was charged with robbery and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence under the Criminal Code. The appellant elected to be tried by a provincial court judge.The sole issue at trial was the appellant’s identity, and the Crown’s evidence on that element was limited to evidence of the unsavoury witness. The trial judge determined that the witness was able to provide recognition evidence. The witness then testified to multiple ways he was able to identify the appellant in the video despite his face being covered. The trial judge accepted the witness’s evidence and concluded that some of the evidence at trial corroborated his testimony. The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery and having his face masked while committing an indictable offence.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal from his conviction and affirmed the conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that there was no error in the trial judge’s application of Vetrovec. The trial judge recognized the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness’s evidence and provided reasons that explained how those challenges were resolved. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge had erred in the treatment of the evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness. The trial judge’s Vetrovec errors were errors of law that warranted appellate intervention. Argued Date 2024-11-08 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Assessment —Unsavoury Crown witnesses — Sufficiency of Vetrovec scrutiny — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s reliance on the identification evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s application of the principles set out in Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Duncan Sinclair, et al. v. Venezia Turismo, Venice Limousine S.R.L, Narduzzi E Solemar S.L.R. (40696)

The appellants, Duncan and Michelle Sinclair, and their son were on a European holiday and were injured in an accident in Venice, Italy. They were passengers on a water taxi that crashed into a wooden structure. The appellants were both injured.The appellants had arranged their travels through Amex Canada Inc., operating under the name Centurion Travel Service which engages third-party travel suppliers for the provision of travel services such as car services, flights and hotel accommodations, at the request and on behalf of Centurion Card members. The day before flying to Venice, Mr. Sinclair booked transportation from the airport in Venice to their hotel, which included a water taxi ride. The water taxi was dispatched by the respondent, Venizia Turismo, and owned by the respondent, Venice Limousine S.R.L.After returning to Canada, the appellants commenced an action seeking damages arising out of the accident. The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the action against them for want of jurisdiction. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The respondents appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of the court found that there was no Ontario contract connecting the dispute to Ontario and allowed the appeal, staying the appellants’ action. Argued Date 2024-11-07 Keywords Private international law — Jurisdiction — Presumptive connecting factors — Whether the court below failed to identify the operative contracts — Was the majority right to overturn the motion judge’s finding of a connection with an Ontario contract — Was the Court of Appeal right to rule that the connection was rebutted? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Duncan Sinclair, et al. v. Venezia Turismo, Venice Limousine S.R.L, Narduzzi E Solemar S.L.R. (40696)

The appellants, Duncan and Michelle Sinclair, and their son were on a European holiday and were injured in an accident in Venice, Italy. They were passengers on a water taxi that crashed into a wooden structure. The appellants were both injured.The appellants had arranged their travels through Amex Canada Inc., operating under the name Centurion Travel Service which engages third-party travel suppliers for the provision of travel services such as car services, flights and hotel accommodations, at the request and on behalf of Centurion Card members. The day before flying to Venice, Mr. Sinclair booked transportation from the airport in Venice to their hotel, which included a water taxi ride. The water taxi was dispatched by the respondent, Venizia Turismo, and owned by the respondent, Venice Limousine S.R.L.After returning to Canada, the appellants commenced an action seeking damages arising out of the accident. The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the action against them for want of jurisdiction. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The respondents appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of the court found that there was no Ontario contract connecting the dispute to Ontario and allowed the appeal, staying the appellants’ action. Argued Date 2024-11-07 Keywords Private international law — Jurisdiction — Presumptive connecting factors — Whether the court below failed to identify the operative contracts — Was the majority right to overturn the motion judge’s finding of a connection with an Ontario contract — Was the Court of Appeal right to rule that the connection was rebutted? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Government of Saskatchewan – Minister of Environment v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, et al. (40740)

The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights.In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted.In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing.In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Government of Saskatchewan – Minister of Environment v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, et al. (40740)

The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights.In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted.In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing.In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Izabela Piekut v. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada as Represented by the Minister of National Revenue (40782)

Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Izabela Piekut v. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada as Represented by the Minister of National Revenue (40782)

Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).