Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Lundin Mining Corporation, et al. v. Dov Markowich (40853)

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario’s Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin’s alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin.Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin’s securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX.The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich’s action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin’s lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company’s failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Lundin Mining Corporation, et al. v. Dov Markowich (40853)

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario’s Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin’s alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin.Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin’s securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX.The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich’s action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin’s lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company’s failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

J.W. v. His Majesty the King (40956)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed.The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

J.W. v. His Majesty the King (40956)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed.The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tammy Marion Bouvette v. His Majesty the King (40780)

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tammy Marion Bouvette v. His Majesty the King (40780)

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).