Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Attorney General of Quebec, et al. v. H. V. (40093)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent, H.V., pleaded guilty to a child luring offence committed between July 31 and August 9, 2017, which was prosecuted summarily. During sentencing, the respondent argued that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, was unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In his view, a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified. The prosecution sought a term of imprisonment of between 9 and 12 months along with probation.The Court of Québec declared that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence was of no force or effect in relation to the accused, suspended the passing of sentence and imposed 2 years of probation with an obligation to perform 150 hours of community service.The Superior Court allowed the appeal and affirmed that the mandatory minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was of no force or effect in relation to the accused under s. 12 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1; it declared the mandatory minimum sentence to be invalid and of no force or effect and set aside the sentence imposed at trial. It sentenced the accused to 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently and 3 years of probation, including 150 hours of community service. It maintained the other terms and conditions imposed and orders made at trial.The Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal, upholding the 90-day sentence of imprisonment and the declaration that the minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was invalid. It held that the Superior Court had not imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence that did not reflect the objective and subjective seriousness of the crime committed and that the Superior Court had not erred in law in finding s. 172.1(2)(b) to be constitutionally invalid. Argued Date 2023-02-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Child luring — Whether s. 172.1(2)(b) of Criminal Code infringes s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(b) — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 12. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty The King, et al. v. Maxime Bertrand Marchand (39935)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual interference committed against a minor under the age of 16 between August 1, 2013 and July 19, 2015. During that period, he and the complainant had full sexual intercourse four times. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of child luring arising from interaction with the complainant on social media between February 25 and September 13, 2015. The trial judge sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 10 months on the count of sexual interference and for 5 months concurrent on the count of child luring. She also found that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. for the offence of child luring was disproportionate in view of the circumstances in which it had been committed in this case and the respondent’s own circumstances, and that it was therefore contrary to s. 12 of the Charter. As a result, she declared it to be of no force or effect with respect to the respondent. The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the sentence of imprisonment for child luring and from the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Levesque J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, increased the sentence for child luring from 5 to 12 months and set aside the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Argued Date 2023-02-15 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in downplaying gravity of offence of child luring based on considerations not relevant for sentencing purposes — Whether majority erred in law in finding that once underlying offence (in this case sexual interference) has been committed, subsequent interaction is less serious, even though it has same objective — Whether s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. is contrary to s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it is appropriate and reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society in accordance with s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Shawn Metzger v. His Majesty the King (40285)

The appellant was charged with multiple offences in relation to a home invasion robbery that took place on or about June 24, 2017. After stealing the homeowner’s possessions, the intruders drove off in his truck. The truck was located 11 hours later. A cigarette butt was seized by police from underneath the driver’s seat and tested for DNA, which returned a single profile matching the appellant. The trial judge convicted the appellant of breaking and entering to steal a firearm, two counts of robbery, and disguise with intent. Various other charges were conditionally stayed. The appellant appealed the convictions, but the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed his appeal. The majority held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence related to the appellant’s recent possession of the stolen truck, or err in relying on the doctrine of recent possession to infer the appellant’s guilt for the home invasion robbery. It also held that the verdicts of guilt were reasonable. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and substituted verdicts of acquittals on all counts. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession and that the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable. Argued Date 2023-02-14 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Assessment, Reasonable verdict - Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Doctrine of recent possession — Reasonable verdict — Whether the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable — Whether the lower courts erred in the application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in law in drawing a negative inference on appeal because the appellant did not testify at trial. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Shawn Metzger v. His Majesty the King (40285)

The appellant was charged with multiple offences in relation to a home invasion robbery that took place on or about June 24, 2017. After stealing the homeowner’s possessions, the intruders drove off in his truck. The truck was located 11 hours later. A cigarette butt was seized by police from underneath the driver’s seat and tested for DNA, which returned a single profile matching the appellant. The trial judge convicted the appellant of breaking and entering to steal a firearm, two counts of robbery, and disguise with intent. Various other charges were conditionally stayed. The appellant appealed the convictions, but the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed his appeal. The majority held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence related to the appellant’s recent possession of the stolen truck, or err in relying on the doctrine of recent possession to infer the appellant’s guilt for the home invasion robbery. It also held that the verdicts of guilt were reasonable. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and substituted verdicts of acquittals on all counts. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession and that the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable. Argued Date 2023-02-14 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Assessment, Reasonable verdict - Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Doctrine of recent possession — Reasonable verdict — Whether the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable — Whether the lower courts erred in the application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in law in drawing a negative inference on appeal because the appellant did not testify at trial. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, A.B., et al. v. Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories, et al. (39915)

In 2018 and 2019, the Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories denied six applications for admission to French-language schools made by non-rights holder parents. The ineligibility of their children was assessed according to the criteria established in the Ministerial Directive — Enrolment of Students in French First Language Education Programs developed by the government of the Territories. Because none of the criteria in the Directive applied in the circumstances, the parents asked the Minister to exercise her residual discretion to authorize the admission of the six children concerned, which was denied. The non-rights holder parents and the school board applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decisions. In two judgments, the Northwest Territories Supreme Court set aside the Minister’s decisions on the ground that there had been no proportionate balancing of the protections guaranteed by s. 23 of the Charter and the government’s interests. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeals and restored her decisions. The court found that the chambers judge’s reasoning on constitutional values had proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the case involved constitutional rights. The families in question did not qualify under s. 23 because they were not rights holders, and they therefore had no legal or statutory right or expectation to have their children attend the French-language schools. Argued Date 2023-02-09 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Administrative law - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Minority language educational rights — Ministerial directive — Administrative law — Discretion — Right to use French in court proceedings — Simultaneous interpretation — Children of non-rights holder parents — Minister denying applications for admission to French-language minority schools — Decisions set aside at first instance but restored on appeal — Whether Minister had to consider purpose of s. 23 in her decision-making process — Whether Minister’s denials were reasonable — Whether there was infringement of right to use French in courts protected by s. 19(1) of Charter and s. 9(1) of OLA — In alternative, whether right to natural justice was breached — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 19(1) and 23 — Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. O-1, s. 9(1). Notes (Northwest Territories) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Daniel Brunelle, et al. v. His Majesty the King (39917)

The appellants, who were charged with various offences related to the large scale trafficking of cannabis, were arrested at the same time in more than one judicial district. They were divided into four different groups for separate trials. The appellants in the first group brought a motion for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process based on a series of infringements of the rights of the accused, and primarily their right to counsel.On August 27, 2018, Dumas J. of the Superior Court entered a stay of proceedings on the ground that the police conduct had undermined the integrity of the justice system. He noted that the infringement of the right to counsel was the most serious infringement. On May 7, 2019, at a hearing before Dumas J., the parties agreed that the decision rendered concerning group 1 would apply to the accused in the other groups. The proceedings against all the other accused were therefore stayed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of August 27, 2018 and May 7, 2019 staying the court proceedings, and ordered a new trial. It found that the trial judge necessarily had to assess the situation of each accused individually, since a remedy could be granted only to a person whose own constitutional rights had been infringed. That error in itself justified a new hearing. Argued Date 2023-02-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Enforcement (s. 24), Abuse of process - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Residual category — Standing — Infringement of right to counsel — Given that infringement of personal right is not determinative in application for stay of proceedings based on residual category, what standing is required to seek remedy in this category through s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether Crown can appeal conclusion of judgment that ends proceedings even though Crown specifically asked trial judge to reach such conclusion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Commission scolaire francophone des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, A.B., et al. v. Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories, et al. (39915)

In 2018 and 2019, the Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories denied six applications for admission to French-language schools made by non-rights holder parents. The ineligibility of their children was assessed according to the criteria established in the Ministerial Directive — Enrolment of Students in French First Language Education Programs developed by the government of the Territories. Because none of the criteria in the Directive applied in the circumstances, the parents asked the Minister to exercise her residual discretion to authorize the admission of the six children concerned, which was denied. The non-rights holder parents and the school board applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decisions. In two judgments, the Northwest Territories Supreme Court set aside the Minister’s decisions on the ground that there had been no proportionate balancing of the protections guaranteed by s. 23 of the Charter and the government’s interests. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeals and restored her decisions. The court found that the chambers judge’s reasoning on constitutional values had proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the case involved constitutional rights. The families in question did not qualify under s. 23 because they were not rights holders, and they therefore had no legal or statutory right or expectation to have their children attend the French-language schools. Argued Date 2023-02-09 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Administrative law - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Minority language educational rights — Ministerial directive — Administrative law — Discretion — Right to use French in court proceedings — Simultaneous interpretation — Children of non-rights holder parents — Minister denying applications for admission to French-language minority schools — Decisions set aside at first instance but restored on appeal — Whether Minister had to consider purpose of s. 23 in her decision-making process — Whether Minister’s denials were reasonable — Whether there was infringement of right to use French in courts protected by s. 19(1) of Charter and s. 9(1) of OLA — In alternative, whether right to natural justice was breached — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 19(1) and 23 — Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. O-1, s. 9(1). Notes (Northwest Territories) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Cindy Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (39856)

The appellant, Cindy Dickson, is a member of the respondent Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (“VGFN”) in the Yukon Territory; she resides in Whitehorse, instead of the VGFN’s Settlement Lands, approximately 800km away, for family medical reasons and other socio-economic reasons. Ms. Dickson sought to stand for election to the Council of the VGFN. However, the VGFN constitution specifies that any Councillor must reside on the Settlement Land (the “residency requirement”); it also states that if an eligible candidate for Chief or Councillor does not reside on Settlement Lands during the election, and wins their desired seat, they must relocate to the Settlement Lands within 14 days of election day. Given that Ms. Dickson was unwilling to move to the Settlement Lands, the VGFN Council declined to remove the residency requirement from the constitution, and rejected Ms. Dickson’s candidacy for the position of Councillor. Ms. Dickson then sought a declaration in the Yukon Supreme Court that the residency requirement was inconsistent with her right to equality protected and guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter, could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and was therefore of no force or effect.The chambers judge issued a number of declarations, concluding that while the Charter applies to the VGFN Council and to the residency requirement in the VGFN constitution, the residency requirement at its core does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, the time limit for relocation specified in the residency requirement — “within 14 days” — does infringe s. 15(1), and should be severed from the requirement and declared to be of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the declaration of invalidity was suspended for 18 months).Alternatively, if this was incorrect and the residency requirement does infringe the s. 15(1) equality right, even without the time limit, the chambers judge concluded that s. 25 of the Charter would apply so as to “shield” the residency requirement (albeit with severance of the words “within 14 days”) from a finding of infringement. Argued Date 2023-02-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Application (s. 32), Right to equality (s. 15), Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Treaty rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Charter of rights — Application — Right to equality — Discrimination based on aboriginality-residence — Aboriginal peoples — Treaty rights — Self-government — First Nation constitution requiring elected Band councillors to relocate to settlement lands within 14 days of election — Appellant’s candidacy for councillor rejected for refusing to relocate if elected — Appellant challenging constitutional validity of residency requirement — Various declarations issued, including that Charter applies to First Nation’s residency requirement, that time limit in requirement infringes right to equality, but that s. 25 of Charter operates so as to shield requirement from review — Whether scope of “other rights and freedoms” that “pertain to aboriginal peoples of Canada” set out in s. 25 of Charter includes residency requirement — Whether court required to conduct full analysis of Charter right engaged, including s. 1, or whether application of s. 25 means collective rights need not be balanced with other interests — Whether Charter applies to residency requirement in constitution of self-governing First Nation — Whether residency requirement inconsistent with Charter, including whether analogous ground of “aboriginality-residence” rigidly applies in all circumstances of Indigenous governance — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15, 25, 32. Notes (Yukon Territory) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Daniel Brunelle, et al. v. His Majesty the King (39917)

The appellants, who were charged with various offences related to the large scale trafficking of cannabis, were arrested at the same time in more than one judicial district. They were divided into four different groups for separate trials. The appellants in the first group brought a motion for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process based on a series of infringements of the rights of the accused, and primarily their right to counsel.On August 27, 2018, Dumas J. of the Superior Court entered a stay of proceedings on the ground that the police conduct had undermined the integrity of the justice system. He noted that the infringement of the right to counsel was the most serious infringement. On May 7, 2019, at a hearing before Dumas J., the parties agreed that the decision rendered concerning group 1 would apply to the accused in the other groups. The proceedings against all the other accused were therefore stayed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of August 27, 2018 and May 7, 2019 staying the court proceedings, and ordered a new trial. It found that the trial judge necessarily had to assess the situation of each accused individually, since a remedy could be granted only to a person whose own constitutional rights had been infringed. That error in itself justified a new hearing. Argued Date 2023-02-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Enforcement (s. 24), Abuse of process - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Residual category — Standing — Infringement of right to counsel — Given that infringement of personal right is not determinative in application for stay of proceedings based on residual category, what standing is required to seek remedy in this category through s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether Crown can appeal conclusion of judgment that ends proceedings even though Crown specifically asked trial judge to reach such conclusion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Cindy Dickson v. Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (39856)

The appellant, Cindy Dickson, is a member of the respondent Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (“VGFN”) in the Yukon Territory; she resides in Whitehorse, instead of the VGFN’s Settlement Lands, approximately 800km away, for family medical reasons and other socio-economic reasons. Ms. Dickson sought to stand for election to the Council of the VGFN. However, the VGFN constitution specifies that any Councillor must reside on the Settlement Land (the “residency requirement”); it also states that if an eligible candidate for Chief or Councillor does not reside on Settlement Lands during the election, and wins their desired seat, they must relocate to the Settlement Lands within 14 days of election day. Given that Ms. Dickson was unwilling to move to the Settlement Lands, the VGFN Council declined to remove the residency requirement from the constitution, and rejected Ms. Dickson’s candidacy for the position of Councillor. Ms. Dickson then sought a declaration in the Yukon Supreme Court that the residency requirement was inconsistent with her right to equality protected and guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter, could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and was therefore of no force or effect.The chambers judge issued a number of declarations, concluding that while the Charter applies to the VGFN Council and to the residency requirement in the VGFN constitution, the residency requirement at its core does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, the time limit for relocation specified in the residency requirement — “within 14 days” — does infringe s. 15(1), and should be severed from the requirement and declared to be of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the declaration of invalidity was suspended for 18 months).Alternatively, if this was incorrect and the residency requirement does infringe the s. 15(1) equality right, even without the time limit, the chambers judge concluded that s. 25 of the Charter would apply so as to “shield” the residency requirement (albeit with severance of the words “within 14 days”) from a finding of infringement. Argued Date 2023-02-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Application (s. 32), Right to equality (s. 15), Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Treaty rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Charter of rights — Application — Right to equality — Discrimination based on aboriginality-residence — Aboriginal peoples — Treaty rights — Self-government — First Nation constitution requiring elected Band councillors to relocate to settlement lands within 14 days of election — Appellant’s candidacy for councillor rejected for refusing to relocate if elected — Appellant challenging constitutional validity of residency requirement — Various declarations issued, including that Charter applies to First Nation’s residency requirement, that time limit in requirement infringes right to equality, but that s. 25 of Charter operates so as to shield requirement from review — Whether scope of “other rights and freedoms” that “pertain to aboriginal peoples of Canada” set out in s. 25 of Charter includes residency requirement — Whether court required to conduct full analysis of Charter right engaged, including s. 1, or whether application of s. 25 means collective rights need not be balanced with other interests — Whether Charter applies to residency requirement in constitution of self-governing First Nation — Whether residency requirement inconsistent with Charter, including whether analogous ground of “aboriginality-residence” rigidly applies in all circumstances of Indigenous governance — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15, 25, 32. Notes (Yukon Territory) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).