Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Attorney General of Québec v. Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan (Day 2/2) (40619)

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec v. Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan (Day 2/2) (40619)

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec v. Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan (40619)

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-23 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec v. Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan (40619)

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-23 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. T.J.F. (40749)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed.The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-03-27 Keywords Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. T.J.F. (40749)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed.The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-03-27 Keywords Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Braydon Wolfe v. His Majesty the King (40558)

After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence. Argued Date 2024-03-26 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Braydon Wolfe v. His Majesty the King (40558)

After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence. Argued Date 2024-03-26 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

International Air Transport Association, et al. v. Canadian Transportation Agency, et al. (40614)

This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel.Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage.Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less.Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel.The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law.These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage). Argued Date 2024-03-25 Keywords Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

International Air Transport Association, et al. v. Canadian Transportation Agency, et al. (40614)

This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel.Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage.Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less.Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel.The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law.These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage). Argued Date 2024-03-25 Keywords Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).