Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

J.W. v. His Majesty the King (40956)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed.The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

J.W. v. His Majesty the King (40956)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed.The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tammy Marion Bouvette v. His Majesty the King (40780)

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tammy Marion Bouvette v. His Majesty the King (40780)

(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Opsis Airport Services Inc. v. Attorney General of Québec, et al. (40786)

The appellant, Opsis Airport Services Inc., is a federal company that operates the emergency call dispatch centre at Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport. The respondent the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions charged Opsis with operating an enterprise that carried on private security activities without holding an agency licence of the appropriate class, contrary to ss. 4 and 114 of the Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5 (“PSA”). Opsis admitted that, without holding an agency licence, it was carrying on activities related to electronic security systems, which are normally subject to the PSA. However, it challenged the PSA’s constitutional applicability.The Court of Québec held that the PSA applied to Opsis and therefore accepted the guilty pleas, convicted Opsis of the offences as charged and imposed fines on it. The court found that the PSA did not intrude on the core of a federal head of power because the PSA had no impact or only a very small impact on Opsis’s operations. The Superior Court allowed Opsis’s appeal, declared the PSA inapplicable to Opsis’s activities related to the operation of the emergency call centre pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, quashed the convictions and acquitted Opsis of the offences charged. The judge held that the PSA intruded on the core of the federal aeronautics power, which included airport security, and that the intrusion constituted an impairment of the core of the federal power. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Superior Court’s judgment and affirmed the convictions entered by the Court of Québec. Although Opsis’s activities fell within the core of Parliament’s aeronautics power, the application of the PSA did not cause any actual impairment. A purely speculative or hypothetical impairment did not suffice. Ruel J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. He was of the view that if the PSA were applicable to Opsis’s operations, the provisions would impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics safety and security. Argued Date 2024-12-11 Keywords Constitutional law — Interjurisdictional immunity — Impairment — Evidence — Federal paramountcy — Conflict of purposes — Provincial offences — Licences — Application of provincial statute to airport security activities — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inapplicable to appellant pursuant to doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity on ground that it impairs Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inoperative in relation to appellant pursuant to doctrine of federal paramountcy on ground that there is conflict of purposes between it and federal legislative scheme relating to aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act and associated regulations apply to appellant’s airport security activities, which are essentially public and governmental in nature — Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Opsis Airport Services Inc. v. Attorney General of Québec, et al. (40786)

The appellant, Opsis Airport Services Inc., is a federal company that operates the emergency call dispatch centre at Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport. The respondent the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions charged Opsis with operating an enterprise that carried on private security activities without holding an agency licence of the appropriate class, contrary to ss. 4 and 114 of the Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5 (“PSA”). Opsis admitted that, without holding an agency licence, it was carrying on activities related to electronic security systems, which are normally subject to the PSA. However, it challenged the PSA’s constitutional applicability.The Court of Québec held that the PSA applied to Opsis and therefore accepted the guilty pleas, convicted Opsis of the offences as charged and imposed fines on it. The court found that the PSA did not intrude on the core of a federal head of power because the PSA had no impact or only a very small impact on Opsis’s operations. The Superior Court allowed Opsis’s appeal, declared the PSA inapplicable to Opsis’s activities related to the operation of the emergency call centre pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, quashed the convictions and acquitted Opsis of the offences charged. The judge held that the PSA intruded on the core of the federal aeronautics power, which included airport security, and that the intrusion constituted an impairment of the core of the federal power. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Superior Court’s judgment and affirmed the convictions entered by the Court of Québec. Although Opsis’s activities fell within the core of Parliament’s aeronautics power, the application of the PSA did not cause any actual impairment. A purely speculative or hypothetical impairment did not suffice. Ruel J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. He was of the view that if the PSA were applicable to Opsis’s operations, the provisions would impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics safety and security. Argued Date 2024-12-11 Keywords Constitutional law — Interjurisdictional immunity — Impairment — Evidence — Federal paramountcy — Conflict of purposes — Provincial offences — Licences — Application of provincial statute to airport security activities — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inapplicable to appellant pursuant to doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity on ground that it impairs Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inoperative in relation to appellant pursuant to doctrine of federal paramountcy on ground that there is conflict of purposes between it and federal legislative scheme relating to aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act and associated regulations apply to appellant’s airport security activities, which are essentially public and governmental in nature — Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Dustin Kinamore v. His Majesty the King (40964)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Mr. Kinamore, when he was 22-years old, and the complainant, when she was 16-years old, met at a motorcycle shop and they exchanged messages for a few months. They met for dinner and a movie at Mr. Kinmore’s apartment. Afterwards, Mr. Kinamore was charged with sexual assault. Both the complainant and Mr. Kinamore testified at trial. The complainant described a sexual assault. Mr. Kinamore described a consensual sexual encounter. Both the Crown and the defence tendered evidence of prior messages between the complainant and Mr. Kinamore. In many text messages, the complainant repeatedly stated that she did not intend to have a sexual relationship with Mr. Kinamore. However, the defence led evidence of communications of a sexual nature and some prior communications entered into evidence by Crown counsel contain content that was sexual in nature or that the defence argued was sexual in nature. No voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by Crown counsel and no application was made pursuant to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by the defence. Mr. Kinamore was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2024-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s sexual activity — Text messages — Accused charged with sexual assault — Whether prior text messages between accused and complainant were of a sexual nature — If so, whether voir dire was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by Crown counsel — Whether application under s. 276 of Criminal Code was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by defence counsel — Whether complainant’s prior text messages were relevant to whether she consented to sexual activity? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Dustin Kinamore v. His Majesty the King (40964)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Mr. Kinamore, when he was 22-years old, and the complainant, when she was 16-years old, met at a motorcycle shop and they exchanged messages for a few months. They met for dinner and a movie at Mr. Kinmore’s apartment. Afterwards, Mr. Kinamore was charged with sexual assault. Both the complainant and Mr. Kinamore testified at trial. The complainant described a sexual assault. Mr. Kinamore described a consensual sexual encounter. Both the Crown and the defence tendered evidence of prior messages between the complainant and Mr. Kinamore. In many text messages, the complainant repeatedly stated that she did not intend to have a sexual relationship with Mr. Kinamore. However, the defence led evidence of communications of a sexual nature and some prior communications entered into evidence by Crown counsel contain content that was sexual in nature or that the defence argued was sexual in nature. No voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by Crown counsel and no application was made pursuant to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by the defence. Mr. Kinamore was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2024-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s sexual activity — Text messages — Accused charged with sexual assault — Whether prior text messages between accused and complainant were of a sexual nature — If so, whether voir dire was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by Crown counsel — Whether application under s. 276 of Criminal Code was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by defence counsel — Whether complainant’s prior text messages were relevant to whether she consented to sexual activity? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).