Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

P.B. v. His Majesty the King (41422)

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant’s evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge’s reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge’s analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

P.B. v. His Majesty the King (41422)

The appellant, P.B., was charged with sexual assault for having allegedly sexually assaulted the complainant on three occasions in the course of one night. At trial, the complainant was the only witness called. The appellant argued that the complainant’s testimony was not sufficiently credible or reliable to prove the case against him beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, he alleged that her evidence was unreliable because she claimed that her memory of the relevant events was based on “flashbacks”. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision, in that he failed to make concrete factual findings about which parts of the complainant’s evidence he accepted and which he did not, and that the trial judge erred in evaluating the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence, notably her “flashback” memory. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed the appeal. On the first issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient. Having read the trial judge’s reasons in a functional and contextual manner, the majority concluded that there is no difficulty discerning what the trial judge decided, from a factual standpoint, and why. The majority found the reasons also contained enough detail to permit appellate review for error. As for the second issue, the majority found that the trial judge’s conclusion on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence is one that a reasonable view of the evidence supports. As such, the majority concluded that there was no proper basis to interfere. In dissent, Barrington-Foote J.A. would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. He concluded that the trial reasons are insufficient to permit effective appellate review and that the trial judge’s analysis on the reliability issues arising from the evidence was very brief and was not enough in the circumstances of this case. Argued Date 2025-03-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Credibility — Sufficiency of reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to identify and apply the correct approach to the analysis of the reliability of evidence of recovered memories based on flashbacks. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

R.A. v. His Majesty the King (41421)

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

R.A. v. His Majesty the King (41421)

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Amari Donawa v. His Majesty the King (41287)

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Amari Donawa v. His Majesty the King (41287)

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Louis-Victor Sylvestre, et al. (41131)

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Louis-Victor Sylvestre, et al. (41131)

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen Emond and Claudette Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Company (41077)

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen Emond and Claudette Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Company (41077)

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).