Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Ahmed Abdullahi v. His Majesty the King (40049)

At trial before judge and jury, the appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi was convicted of various gun-related offences including one count of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code. The charges resulted from a police investigation dubbed “Project Traveller”.A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Brown J.A. with Trotter J.A. concurring) dismissed the three grounds the appellant raised pertaining to his conviction appeal. First, the majority rejected his argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the Somali-language translator regarding portions of intercepted communications. Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury adequately on the definition of “criminal organization” in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant had submitted on appeal that the charge did not provide guidance on the requisite degree of structure and continuity mentioned in R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, to constitute a criminal organization. On this point, the majority concluded that defence counsel’s lack of objection was indicative of the legal adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions on this definition given the evidence heard by the jury and the positions taken by the parties in closing submissions. Third, the majority held the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that they could consider certain after the fact conduct.In dissent, Paciocco J.A. only disagreed on one ground of the conviction appeal: he would have concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately charge the jury on the “criminal organization” definition in s. 467.1(1) and would have therefore set aside the appellant’s conviction for the count setting out the offence at s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code of “participating in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons” and ordered a new trial on that charge. Argued Date 2023-01-11 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Definition — Participating in activities of criminal organization for purpose of trafficking weapons — What constitutes adequate jury instruction on definition of “criminal organization” under s. 467.1 (1) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, with respect to essential elements of structure and continuity? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. S.S. (40147)

(PUBLICATION BAN)The respondent was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, two offences perpetrated on the complainant when she was between six and eight years old. The convictions were based on the complainant’s unsworn, videotaped police statement, which the trial judge admitted into evidence by application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, based on the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, concluding that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the out-of-court statement into evidence. MacPherson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal from conviction. Argued Date 2023-01-10 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law – Evidence – Admissibility – Hearsay – Videotaped out-of-court statement given by complainant – Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statement by (i) finding that the statement met the requirements of threshold reliability; and (ii) finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate the allegations. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (Day 2/2) (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (Day 1/2) (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikerlson Vernelus v. His Majesty the King (40072)

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikerlson Vernelus v. His Majesty the King (40072)

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

James Allan Anderson v. Diana Anderson (39884)

The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent.The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

James Allan Anderson v. Diana Anderson (39884)

The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent.The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. David Edward Furey (40038)

The respondent, David Edward Furey, was convicted of breaking and entering into a dwelling, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking. At trial, the judge admitted, for the truth of its contents, a videotaped out of court statement given by one of the complainants, who subsequently died of unrelated causes. The statement was given to the police soon after the altercations.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Furey’s appeal from convictions, set aside the decision of the trial judge, including the voir dire decision regarding the admissibility of the complainant’s out-of-court statement, and ordered a new trial. The majority concluded that the trial judge applied an erroneous statement of the law — that where there is greater necessity, less reliability is acceptable. As a result of her reliance on this statement, the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out of court statement for the truth of its contents: she permitted the admissibility of the hearsay evidence without requiring that the requisite degree of reliability be established. In dissent, Knickle J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In her view, the trial judge committed no error in her application of the principled approach to the hearsay evidence, as she engaged in the skeptical and cautious analysis that was required before admitting the statement, including that the two criteria of necessity and reliability must be assessed in tandem and with flexibility. Argued Date 2022-12-02 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Videotaped out of court statement given by complainant who died before trial — Whether the majority of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the “threshold” admissibility of an out of court statement. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).