Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Andrei Bykovets v. His Majesty the King (40269)

In September 2017, the police commenced an investigation related to the purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information. The police was told that the fraudulent online transactions used two IP addresses. The police obtained warrants to search the two residences associated with the IP addresses. The appellant was arrested and charged with 33 offences relating to the possession and use of third parties’ credit cards and personal identification documents, and firearms. The appellant filed a notice alleging the breach of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter as well as other rights. The trial judge found that it was not objectively reasonable to recognize a subjective expectation of privacy in an IP address used by an individual. She concluded that there was no breach of s. 8. The appellant was eventually convicted of 13 of the original 33 counts, which he appealed. The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed the appeal. It found that the trial judge correctly interpreted the scope of the law that governed her s. 8 analysis. The majority concluded that she applied the correct interpretation to her factual findings, which reveal no palpable or overriding error. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She found that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses and that his s. 8 rights were violated. Argued Date 2023-01-17 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Search and seizure (s. 8) - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Investigation related to purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information — Police obtaining internet protocol (“IP”) addresses to locate residences — Whether reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to IP address — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Antoine Ponce, et al. v. Société d’investissements Rhéaume ltée, et al. (39931)

The appellants, Mr. Ponce and Mr. Riopel, served as presidents of three companies grouped together under the name “Le Groupe Excellence” controlled by the respondent shareholders, Mr. Rhéaume and Mr. Beaulne. Rhéaume and Beaulne founded Excellence in the late 1970’s, but their working relationship ultimately broke down due to a revenue share dispute. A few years later, the appellants bought the respondents’ interests in Excellence. Rhéaume and Beaulne were unaware, however, that the appellants had been negotiating the sale of Excellence to a third party, Industrial Alliance. Shortly after acquiring the shares of Rhéaume and Beaulne, the appellants sold their interests in Excellence for a significant profit. The respondents allege that the sale of Excellence by the appellants stripped them of a business opportunity. They applied to the courts and claimed joint and several damages against the appellants. The Superior Court granted the respondents’ action in part. The court determined that the appellants used their roles to obtain information for their own benefit, and breached duties of good faith, integrity and loyalty owing to Rhéaume and Beaulne as shareholders. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Although it found that the trial judge made an error in determining that the duty of loyalty was owed to the shareholders, as opposed to the corporation, this error was not determinative since the judge also relied on the obligation of good faith and the duty to inform to conclude that the appellants were at fault towards the respondents. Argued Date 2023-01-12 Keywords Civil liability - Commercial law - Civil liability — Duty to inform — Duty of good faith — Loss of chance — Commercial law — Corporations — Directors of corporation buying out controlling shareholders — Subsequent offers by third party to buy interests of directors of corporation — Interest of third party not made known to former controlling shareholders — Former controlling shareholders alleging improper appropriation of business opportunity by directors — Scope of duties owing to controlling shareholders — Given its distinction in Quebec civil law with the duty of loyalty, whether the duty to inform, deriving from the duty to act in good faith, places the responsibility on a prospective buyer to inform a prospective seller about the market for the sale — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in upholding the award of disgorgement in the absence of a duty of loyalty — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in awarding damages for a loss of chance to negotiate in the absence of a basis for disgorgement. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Antoine Ponce, et al. v. Société d’investissements Rhéaume ltée, et al. (39931)

The appellants, Mr. Ponce and Mr. Riopel, served as presidents of three companies grouped together under the name “Le Groupe Excellence” controlled by the respondent shareholders, Mr. Rhéaume and Mr. Beaulne. Rhéaume and Beaulne founded Excellence in the late 1970’s, but their working relationship ultimately broke down due to a revenue share dispute. A few years later, the appellants bought the respondents’ interests in Excellence. Rhéaume and Beaulne were unaware, however, that the appellants had been negotiating the sale of Excellence to a third party, Industrial Alliance. Shortly after acquiring the shares of Rhéaume and Beaulne, the appellants sold their interests in Excellence for a significant profit. The respondents allege that the sale of Excellence by the appellants stripped them of a business opportunity. They applied to the courts and claimed joint and several damages against the appellants. The Superior Court granted the respondents’ action in part. The court determined that the appellants used their roles to obtain information for their own benefit, and breached duties of good faith, integrity and loyalty owing to Rhéaume and Beaulne as shareholders. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Although it found that the trial judge made an error in determining that the duty of loyalty was owed to the shareholders, as opposed to the corporation, this error was not determinative since the judge also relied on the obligation of good faith and the duty to inform to conclude that the appellants were at fault towards the respondents. Argued Date 2023-01-12 Keywords Civil liability - Commercial law - Civil liability — Duty to inform — Duty of good faith — Loss of chance — Commercial law — Corporations — Directors of corporation buying out controlling shareholders — Subsequent offers by third party to buy interests of directors of corporation — Interest of third party not made known to former controlling shareholders — Former controlling shareholders alleging improper appropriation of business opportunity by directors — Scope of duties owing to controlling shareholders — Given its distinction in Quebec civil law with the duty of loyalty, whether the duty to inform, deriving from the duty to act in good faith, places the responsibility on a prospective buyer to inform a prospective seller about the market for the sale — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in upholding the award of disgorgement in the absence of a duty of loyalty — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in awarding damages for a loss of chance to negotiate in the absence of a basis for disgorgement. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ahmed Abdullahi v. His Majesty the King (40049)

At trial before judge and jury, the appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi was convicted of various gun-related offences including one count of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code. The charges resulted from a police investigation dubbed “Project Traveller”.A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Brown J.A. with Trotter J.A. concurring) dismissed the three grounds the appellant raised pertaining to his conviction appeal. First, the majority rejected his argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the Somali-language translator regarding portions of intercepted communications. Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury adequately on the definition of “criminal organization” in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant had submitted on appeal that the charge did not provide guidance on the requisite degree of structure and continuity mentioned in R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, to constitute a criminal organization. On this point, the majority concluded that defence counsel’s lack of objection was indicative of the legal adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions on this definition given the evidence heard by the jury and the positions taken by the parties in closing submissions. Third, the majority held the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that they could consider certain after the fact conduct.In dissent, Paciocco J.A. only disagreed on one ground of the conviction appeal: he would have concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately charge the jury on the “criminal organization” definition in s. 467.1(1) and would have therefore set aside the appellant’s conviction for the count setting out the offence at s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code of “participating in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons” and ordered a new trial on that charge. Argued Date 2023-01-11 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Definition — Participating in activities of criminal organization for purpose of trafficking weapons — What constitutes adequate jury instruction on definition of “criminal organization” under s. 467.1 (1) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, with respect to essential elements of structure and continuity? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ahmed Abdullahi v. His Majesty the King (40049)

At trial before judge and jury, the appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi was convicted of various gun-related offences including one count of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code. The charges resulted from a police investigation dubbed “Project Traveller”.A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Brown J.A. with Trotter J.A. concurring) dismissed the three grounds the appellant raised pertaining to his conviction appeal. First, the majority rejected his argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the Somali-language translator regarding portions of intercepted communications. Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury adequately on the definition of “criminal organization” in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant had submitted on appeal that the charge did not provide guidance on the requisite degree of structure and continuity mentioned in R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, to constitute a criminal organization. On this point, the majority concluded that defence counsel’s lack of objection was indicative of the legal adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions on this definition given the evidence heard by the jury and the positions taken by the parties in closing submissions. Third, the majority held the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that they could consider certain after the fact conduct.In dissent, Paciocco J.A. only disagreed on one ground of the conviction appeal: he would have concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately charge the jury on the “criminal organization” definition in s. 467.1(1) and would have therefore set aside the appellant’s conviction for the count setting out the offence at s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code of “participating in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons” and ordered a new trial on that charge. Argued Date 2023-01-11 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Definition — Participating in activities of criminal organization for purpose of trafficking weapons — What constitutes adequate jury instruction on definition of “criminal organization” under s. 467.1 (1) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, with respect to essential elements of structure and continuity? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. S.S. (40147)

(PUBLICATION BAN)The respondent was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, two offences perpetrated on the complainant when she was between six and eight years old. The convictions were based on the complainant’s unsworn, videotaped police statement, which the trial judge admitted into evidence by application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, based on the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, concluding that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the out-of-court statement into evidence. MacPherson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal from conviction. Argued Date 2023-01-10 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law – Evidence – Admissibility – Hearsay – Videotaped out-of-court statement given by complainant – Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statement by (i) finding that the statement met the requirements of threshold reliability; and (ii) finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate the allegations. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (Day 2/2) (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, et al. (Day 1/2) (40061)

By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikerlson Vernelus v. His Majesty the King (40072)

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).