Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Mikerlson Vernelus v. His Majesty the King (40072)

After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

James Allan Anderson v. Diana Anderson (39884)

The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent.The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

James Allan Anderson v. Diana Anderson (39884)

The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent.The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. David Edward Furey (40038)

The respondent, David Edward Furey, was convicted of breaking and entering into a dwelling, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking. At trial, the judge admitted, for the truth of its contents, a videotaped out of court statement given by one of the complainants, who subsequently died of unrelated causes. The statement was given to the police soon after the altercations.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Furey’s appeal from convictions, set aside the decision of the trial judge, including the voir dire decision regarding the admissibility of the complainant’s out-of-court statement, and ordered a new trial. The majority concluded that the trial judge applied an erroneous statement of the law — that where there is greater necessity, less reliability is acceptable. As a result of her reliance on this statement, the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out of court statement for the truth of its contents: she permitted the admissibility of the hearsay evidence without requiring that the requisite degree of reliability be established. In dissent, Knickle J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In her view, the trial judge committed no error in her application of the principled approach to the hearsay evidence, as she engaged in the skeptical and cautious analysis that was required before admitting the statement, including that the two criteria of necessity and reliability must be assessed in tandem and with flexibility. Argued Date 2022-12-02 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Videotaped out of court statement given by complainant who died before trial — Whether the majority of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the “threshold” admissibility of an out of court statement. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. David Edward Furey (40038)

The respondent, David Edward Furey, was convicted of breaking and entering into a dwelling, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking. At trial, the judge admitted, for the truth of its contents, a videotaped out of court statement given by one of the complainants, who subsequently died of unrelated causes. The statement was given to the police soon after the altercations.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Furey’s appeal from convictions, set aside the decision of the trial judge, including the voir dire decision regarding the admissibility of the complainant’s out-of-court statement, and ordered a new trial. The majority concluded that the trial judge applied an erroneous statement of the law — that where there is greater necessity, less reliability is acceptable. As a result of her reliance on this statement, the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out of court statement for the truth of its contents: she permitted the admissibility of the hearsay evidence without requiring that the requisite degree of reliability be established. In dissent, Knickle J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In her view, the trial judge committed no error in her application of the principled approach to the hearsay evidence, as she engaged in the skeptical and cautious analysis that was required before admitting the statement, including that the two criteria of necessity and reliability must be assessed in tandem and with flexibility. Argued Date 2022-12-02 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Videotaped out of court statement given by complainant who died before trial — Whether the majority of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the “threshold” admissibility of an out of court statement. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ryan David Clark v. His Majesty the King (40090)

Before the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant, Ryan David Clark, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The main issue at trial was the identity of the person who had beaten the deceased to death.On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the trial judge erred by failing to address the frailties of eyewitness evidence in his instructions to the jury, particularly with regard to in-court identification by two witnesses. He also argued that the trial judge erred by allowing other witnesses to provide bad character and post-offence conduct evidence and by failing to adequately caution the jury in relation to that testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The jury instructions properly equipped the jury to understand its task in evaluating all of the eyewitness identification evidence, including the in-court identification. It was adequately prepared to examine the frailties of the evidence of the two particular witnesses and to determine if it would accept their testimony as credible and reliable in accordance with the law. The trial judge also did not err in regard to post-offence conduct and bad character evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.In dissent, Leurer J.A. would have allowed Mr. Clark’s appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the jury charge did not adequately equip the jurors to deal with the frailties of the in-court eyewitness identification evidence in this case. Argued Date 2022-11-30 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Eyewitness evidence — Identification — In-court identification — Caution — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution alerting jurors that a witness’s testimony had limited value for the purposes of identifying the assailant who killed the victim, and that this witness’s in court identification of the appellant had no evidentiary value — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution on the problematic nature of another witness’s in-court identification of the appellant, and that it would be dangerous to attribute to this identification any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police prior — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law by concluding the instructions on eyewitness identification evidence did not give rise to reversible legal error. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Earl Mason, et al. v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, et al. (39855)

Section 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) provides that permanent residents or foreign nationals are “inadmissible on security grounds” for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. The Minister alleged that both appellants were foreign nationals who were inadmissible under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA.The issue before the Immigration Board and the Immigration Appeal Division was whether s. 34(1)(e) applied only where there is a connection to national security. Both agreed with the Minister that it did not. In their view, s. 34(1)(e) operates whether or not there is a connection to national security.On judicial review, the Federal Court quashed the decisions in the two cases.Both cases were heard together at the Federal Court of Appeal. It allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court and dismissed the applications for judicial review. It found the administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) was reasonable and answered the following certified question:Q.: Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”?A. Yes. Argued Date 2022-11-29 Keywords Immigration - Judicial review - Immigration — Inadmissibility on security grounds for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada” — Judicial review — Interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) — Whether reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA requires national security nexus — Whether s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA can apply to conduct that does not require a nexus to “national security” or “security of Canada” — How should reviewing courts determine whether a legislative provision can bear only one reasonable interpretation and what constraints will bear on this assessment — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning Federal Court’s findings that tribunal decisions were unreasonable. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

D.R. v. His Majesty the King (40039)

(PUBLICATION BAN)At trial, the appellant was acquitted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault respecting the complainant, a person under the age of 16 years. A majority of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial. It held that the trial judge engaged in impermissible stereotypical reasoning when assessing the complainant’s credibility by relying on the stereotypes that a victim could not be happy to see her abuser regardless of her age and circumstances, and that a victim will exhibit avoidant behaviour around her abuser if she were truly being abused. In dissent, White J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, the trial judge did not rely on any myth or stereotype about sexual assault when assessing the complainant’s credibility. Argued Date 2022-12-01 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law — Evidence — Credibility — Stereotypical reasoning — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in ruling that the trial judge relied upon impermissible stereotypes of victims of sexual abuse when he assessed the complainant’s credibility. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ryan David Clark v. His Majesty the King (40090)

Before the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant, Ryan David Clark, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The main issue at trial was the identity of the person who had beaten the deceased to death.On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the trial judge erred by failing to address the frailties of eyewitness evidence in his instructions to the jury, particularly with regard to in-court identification by two witnesses. He also argued that the trial judge erred by allowing other witnesses to provide bad character and post-offence conduct evidence and by failing to adequately caution the jury in relation to that testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The jury instructions properly equipped the jury to understand its task in evaluating all of the eyewitness identification evidence, including the in-court identification. It was adequately prepared to examine the frailties of the evidence of the two particular witnesses and to determine if it would accept their testimony as credible and reliable in accordance with the law. The trial judge also did not err in regard to post-offence conduct and bad character evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.In dissent, Leurer J.A. would have allowed Mr. Clark’s appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the jury charge did not adequately equip the jurors to deal with the frailties of the in-court eyewitness identification evidence in this case. Argued Date 2022-11-30 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Eyewitness evidence — Identification — In-court identification — Caution — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution alerting jurors that a witness’s testimony had limited value for the purposes of identifying the assailant who killed the victim, and that this witness’s in court identification of the appellant had no evidentiary value — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution on the problematic nature of another witness’s in-court identification of the appellant, and that it would be dangerous to attribute to this identification any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police prior — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law by concluding the instructions on eyewitness identification evidence did not give rise to reversible legal error. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Earl Mason, et al. v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, et al. (39855)

Section 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) provides that permanent residents or foreign nationals are “inadmissible on security grounds” for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. The Minister alleged that both appellants were foreign nationals who were inadmissible under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA.The issue before the Immigration Board and the Immigration Appeal Division was whether s. 34(1)(e) applied only where there is a connection to national security. Both agreed with the Minister that it did not. In their view, s. 34(1)(e) operates whether or not there is a connection to national security.On judicial review, the Federal Court quashed the decisions in the two cases.Both cases were heard together at the Federal Court of Appeal. It allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court and dismissed the applications for judicial review. It found the administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) was reasonable and answered the following certified question:Q.: Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”?A. Yes. Argued Date 2022-11-29 Keywords Immigration - Judicial review - Immigration — Inadmissibility on security grounds for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada” — Judicial review — Interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) — Whether reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA requires national security nexus — Whether s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA can apply to conduct that does not require a nexus to “national security” or “security of Canada” — How should reviewing courts determine whether a legislative provision can bear only one reasonable interpretation and what constraints will bear on this assessment — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning Federal Court’s findings that tribunal decisions were unreasonable. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).