Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Annapolis Group Inc. seeks to develop lands that it owns. The lands lie within the boundary of Halifax Regional Municipality. Council of Halifax Regional Municipality declined to commence a planning process and to amend a by-law, both of which are required to permit development of the lands. Annapolis Group Inc. alleges Halifax Regional Municipality encourages members of the public to use the lands as a public park. It commenced an action seeking damages for alleged de facto expropriation, abuse of public office and unjust enrichment. Halifax Regional Municipality filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim of de facto expropriation. The motions judge dismissed the motion. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and dismissed the claim of de facto expropriation. Argued Date 2022-02-16 Keywords Expropriation - Municipal law - Expropriation - Municipal law - Municipal council declines to initiate planning process required by developer to develop lands - Public uses lands as a park - Whether exercise of a zoning power which deprives a landowner of the reasonable uses of its land in favour of creating a public park carries an implied obligation to pay compensation - Whether test for de facto expropriation should be revisited - Whether motive of government authority is a relevant consideration in considering whether a de facto taking occurred?. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter in relation to the death of their roommate. After being initially detained by officers at the scene under a non-existent law, they were arrested by detectives for murder two hours later at the police station. Following a lengthy interview, Lambert confessed to their involvement in the death of the roommate; when confronted with the confession, Beaver admitted his participation as well. At trial, the appellants sought the exclusion of all evidence which derived from alleged violations of their rights protected by ss. 7, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They also alleged that the detective who arrested them at the station did not have reasonable and probable grounds to do so. The Crown conceded that the appellants’ Charter rights had been breached when they were detained under a non-existent law, but argued that the arrest at the station constituted a “fresh start” which insulated the confessions from the previous breaches. The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder at the police station, and that the arrests constituted a “fresh start” which cured the previous breaches. He concluded that the appellants’ subsequent confessions had not been tainted by the breaches. Nevertheless, the trial judge conducted a s. 24(2) analysis as set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, and concluded that the confessions would have been admitted, in any event. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellants’ appeals.
Argued Date
2022-02-14
Keywords
Criminal law - Charter of Rights, Evidence, Admissibility - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Evidence - Admissibility - Reasonable and probable grounds for arrest - Under what circumstances can police attempts at a “fresh start” insulate evidence from admissibility consideration pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter - Should judicial scrutiny of reasonable and probable grounds be more stringent in circumstances where the arrestee was unlawfully detained and police have no notes regarding the grounds for arrest or the information relied upon - What information must be imparted to a detainee to permit them to make a meaningful choice about whether or not to speak with police?.
Notes
(Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave)
Disclaimers
This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was adapted from one prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Following an investigation into cocaine trafficking, the appellant was arrested and subjected to a strip search, which yielded three small bags of cocaine. At trial, the appellant applied to exclude the evidence on the basis that the strip search had not been justified at law. The trial judge concluded that the police had the requisite reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search and admitted the evidence, and the appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.A majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta dismissed the appellant’s appeal, holding that the trial judge had not erred in concluding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search, in accordance with R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679. In dissent, Veldhuis J.A. was of the view that the appellant’s s. 8 Charter right had been breached. She would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2022-01-14 Keywords Criminal law - Search and seizure (s. 8) - Criminal law — Search and seizure — Search incident to arrest — Strip search — Whether the trial judge considered the correct test for a strip search — Whether the trial judge was permitted to consider hearsay evidence in her assessment of the grounds for conducting a strip search — Whether the trial judge erred in finding no violation of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether acquittal proper relief. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondents, Mélanie Ste Marie, Michel Ste Marie, Dax Ste Marie and Richard Felx, were charged with conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime, laundering proceeds of crime, and commission of an offence for a criminal organization. In the Court of Québec, the respondents moved for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay. The Court of Québec found that s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed but declined to stay the proceedings. It convicted the respondents of the offences charged. On appeal from the guilty verdicts, the Quebec Court of Appeal had to determine whether the Court of Québec had erred in declining to stay the proceedings after finding unreasonable delay. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeals, quashed the convictions and ordered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2022-02-10 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Remedy - Charter of Rights Criminal law Right to be tried within a reasonable time Remedy Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in granting final stay of proceedings without addressing point of law validly raised by Crown, respondent in Court of Appeal, namely proper attribution of delay relating to extraordinary recourses exercised by defence Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in reviewing only part of legal framework of decision on motion for stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, though framework ill defined by trial judge. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Marc-André Boulanger, faced four charges laid under, among other things, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The Court of Québec granted the respondent’s motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and entered a stay of proceedings on the four charges. The trial judge found a net delay of 32 months and 10 days, which was therefore above the presumptive ceiling of 30 months.The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal from the Court of Québec’s decision. Although the majority’s analysis differed from that of the trial judge with regard to the delay related to the unavailability of the respondent’s lawyer, the majority was of the view that the trial judge had correctly stayed the proceedings and agreed with the judge’s overall assessment of the main cause of the delay in the progress of this case: the absence of a carefully crafted prosecution plan. Chamberland J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Québec’s decision, dismissed the respondent’s motion for a stay of proceedings, and referred the case back to the same judge for a decision on the outcome of the trial. In his view, 84 days had to be added to the defence delay, resulting in a net delay below the applicable 30 month ceiling. Argued Date 2022-02-09 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Right to be tried within a reasonable time - Criminal law - Whether majority erred in law in refusing to subtract 84 day delay for which respondent admitted being responsible and which was attributable to his conduct - Whether majority erred in law in interfering with trial judge’s decision to attribute to respondent 112-day delay caused by fact that his lawyer was unavailable, even though that finding was within judge’s discretion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)In 2002, G was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder on charges of sexual assault and other charges. In 2003, G was given an absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board. However, pursuant to Christopher’s Law ( Offender Registry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 1, G was obliged to register under the provincial offender registry and report to provincial authorities for life. G was also required to register and report under the federal registry, pursuant to the Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”). In 2014, G commenced legal proceedings seeking a declaration that the application of the federal and provincial offender registries to persons found not criminally responsible who are then granted a subsequent absolute discharge infringes their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed G’s application. The application judge found that despite some negative impact resulting from the offender registry requirements, there was no s. 7 or s. 15 Charter breach. The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously allowed G’s appeal and concluded that the provincial and federal offender registries infringe G’s s. 15 Charter rights (and those of individuals in his situation), and that such infringements cannot be saved under s. 1. In terms of remedy, the Court of Appeal declared Christopher’s Law and SOIRA to be of no force or effect in their application to individuals in G’s situation. It suspended the effect of the declaration for 12 months; however, it exempted G from this suspension.The Attorney General of Ontario is appealing the portion of the Court of Appeal’s judgment granting an individual exemption from the period of suspension to G. Argued Date 2020-02-20 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to equality, Discrimination based on mental or physical disability, Remedy, Criminal law, Mental disorder, Constitutional law - Charter of rights - Right to equality - Discrimination based on mental or physical disability - Remedy - Criminal law -Mental disorder - Respondent found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder in respect of sexual assault and other charges - Respondent granted absolute discharge but required to register under provincial offender registry and report to authorities for life, and required to register and report under federal registry - Application judge finding no breach under ss. 7 or 15 of Charter - Court of Appeal finding breach of s. 15 and declaring operation of offender registry legislation unconstitutional - Declaration of invalidity suspended for 12 months but respondent exempt from period of suspension - Whether offender registry legislation infringes right to equality without discrimination based on absence of individualized exceptions - If so, whether infringement is reasonable limit demonstrably justified in free and democratic society - Whether s. 15 of Charter requires individualized assessment before requiring persons found not criminally responsible who are granted absolute discharge to register and report under offender registry - Whether Court of Appeal erred in declining to follow R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 and in granting individual relief to respondent during period of suspension of declaration of invalidity - Christopher’s Law ( Offender Registry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 1 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 15. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Ca

Ashley Suzanne Barendregt v. Geoff Bradley Grebliunas
The parties were married in 2013 and separated in 2018 and have two children, ages 7 and 5. In December 2019, the trial judge granted the appellant’s application for primary residence of the children and to relocate with them to a town a thousand kilometres away from the former matrimonial home where the respondent resided. This decision was overturned on appeal but the order was stayed.
Tiffany Jo Kreke v. Amro Abdullah M Alansari
The parties separated after ten years of marriage. They had one child together and the applicant had two children from a previous marriage. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision that awarded joint custody of the one child, with primary care to the applicant and allowed her to relocate within the province with that child. It also reduced the amount of spousal support awarded to her. A new trial was ordered on the issues of custody, access, primary care and relocation.
B.J.T. v. J.D.
The father and mother were married in 2012 in Alberta and separated less than a year later when the mother returned to Prince Edward Island. The father was unaware that the mother was pregnant when she left. Shortly after the child was born, the applicant grandmother came to reside with the mother and child. When the child was four years of age, and residing only with his mother, he was apprehended by the Director of Child Protection. He was eventually placed in the care of the applicant. The Director subsequently alerted the father of the child’s existence then supported his contested application for permanent custody. The trial judge held that the child should be permanently placed with the grandmother in Prince Edward Island. On appeal, the majority held that the child should be permanently placed in his father’s custody in Alberta.
Argued Date
2021-12-01 and 2021-12-02
Disclaimers
This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was excerpted from material prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ashley Suzanne Barendregt v. Geoff Bradley Grebliunas
The parties were married in 2013 and separated in 2018 and have two children, ages 7 and 5. In December 2019, the trial judge granted the appellant’s application for primary residence of the children and to relocate with them to a town a thousand kilometres away from the former matrimonial home where the respondent resided. This decision was overturned on appeal but the order was stayed.
Tiffany Jo Kreke v. Amro Abdullah M Alansari
The parties separated after ten years of marriage. They had one child together and the applicant had two children from a previous marriage. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision that awarded joint custody of the one child, with primary care to the applicant and allowed her to relocate within the province with that child. It also reduced the amount of spousal support awarded to her. A new trial was ordered on the issues of custody, access, primary care and relocation.
B.J.T. v. J.D.
The father and mother were married in 2012 in Alberta and separated less than a year later when the mother returned to Prince Edward Island. The father was unaware that the mother was pregnant when she left. Shortly after the child was born, the applicant grandmother came to reside with the mother and child. When the child was four years of age, and residing only with his mother, he was apprehended by the Director of Child Protection. He was eventually placed in the care of the applicant. The Director subsequently alerted the father of the child’s existence then supported his contested application for permanent custody. The trial judge held that the child should be permanently placed with the grandmother in Prince Edward Island. On appeal, the majority held that the child should be permanently placed in his father’s custody in Alberta.
Argued Date
2021-12-01 and 2021-12-02
Disclaimers
This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was excerpted from material prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The parties entered into a partnership agreement and a guarantee and cross indemnity agreement. The partnership, Peace River Hydro Partners, commenced work. It subcontracted some work to Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates pursuant to purchase orders and it entered into a subcontract agreement with Petrowest Civil Services LP. Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates became insolvent. Ernst and Young Inc. was appointed as their receiver. Ernst & Young Inc. assigned Petrowest Corporations’s affiliates into bankruptcy and thereafter acted as both a trustee in bankruptcy and a receiver. Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates commenced a civil claim alleging amounts are owed to them under the general partnership agreement, the guarantee and cross-indemnity agreement, the purchase orders, and the subcontract agreement. These agreements contain arbitration clauses. The appellants applied under s. 15 of the Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 55, to stay the proceedings so that the matters could be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2022-01-19 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Receiver, Commercial law, Contracts, Arbitration agreement - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Receivership — Commercial law — Contracts — Arbitration agreements — Receiver and trustee in bankruptcy of debtor companies claims contracting parties owe amounts to debtor companies — Receiver commences action — Agreements in issue contain mandatory arbitration clauses — Contracting parties seek stay of proceedings and arbitration — Whether receiver bound by arbitration clauses — Whether doctrine of separability allows receivers to disclaim arbitration clauses within agreements while pursuing rights under same agreements — Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 55, s. 15. Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (“SOCAN”) administers the right to “communicate” musical works on behalf of copyright owners. It filed proposed tariffs for the communication to the public by telecommunication of work in its repertoire through an online music service. However, before the Board considered the proposed tariffs, the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, amended the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. In particular, it added three “making available” provisions in ss. 2.4(1.1), 15(1.1)(d) and 18(1.1)(a). Section 2.4(1.1) provides that, for the purposes of the Copyright Act, “communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public”. A few days after the Copyright Modernization Act was enacted but before it came into force, Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 (“ESA”), was released. It held that the transmission of a musical work over the Internet that results in a download of that work is not a communication by telecommunication, so royalties were not available for those downloads.In relation to SOCAN’s proposed tariffs, the Board decided to consider the interpretation of the “making available” provisions separately from the tariff. It invited written submissions from anyone with an interest in the interpretation of the “making available” provisions and received submissions from more than 30 organizations. It found that s. 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act deems the act of making a work available to the public a “communication to the public” within s. 3(1)(f) of that Act and, thus, an act that triggers a tariff entitlement. The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Board’s decision regarding the meaning of the “making available” provisions. Argued Date 2022-01-18 Keywords Intellectual property - Copyright - Intellectual property - Copyright - Right to communicate work to public by telecommunication - Making available - Communication to public by telecommunication defined as including making work or other subject matter available to public by telecommunication such that public may have access to it at place and time chose by them in Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 42, s. 2.4(1.1) - Whether s. 2.4(1.1) makes the act of making a work available to the public for on-demand access a communication to the public by telecommunication attracts a licence fee, whether the work is subsequently transmitted as a stream, a download, in another format, or not at all - Whether s. 2.4(1.1) expands the meaning of “communication” to include the initial act of making available to the public, regardless of the means of transmission, or whether it is transmitted at all, and any subsequent transmission - Whether any subsequent transmissions merge with the initial act of making available - Whether the expanded communication right is first triggered by the initial act of making content accessible and extends to all subsequent transmissions, if they occur, irrespective of the timing or technological means of transmission - How s. 2.4(1.1) affects Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the