Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Government of Saskatchewan – Minister of Environment v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, et al. (40740)

The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights.In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted.In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing.In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Government of Saskatchewan – Minister of Environment v. Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, et al. (40740)

The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights.In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted.In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing.In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Izabela Piekut v. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada as Represented by the Minister of National Revenue (40782)

Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Izabela Piekut v. His Majesty the King in Right of Canada as Represented by the Minister of National Revenue (40782)

Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

I.M. v. His Majesty the King (40868)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant participated in a planned robbery with intent to steal a firearm from a seventeen year old youth. He and his co-assailants attacked the victim outside his residence. They beat him and stabbed him. Their victim died from his wounds. The appellant and his co-assailants then entered the victim’s home, pistol-whipped the victim’s mother, and searched the home for firearms. The appellant was charged with first degree murder. He was seventeen years old at the time of the offence and was tried before a jury in Youth Justice Court. He conceded at trial that he was guilty of manslaughter because he willingly participated in a planned robbery. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder. The Crown applied to have the appellant sentenced as an adult. The sentencing judge granted the application and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 10 years. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentencing decision. Argued Date 2024-10-15 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Young person sentenced as adult — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in sentencing a young person as an adult on the basis that Crown counsel rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

I.M. v. His Majesty the King (40868)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant participated in a planned robbery with intent to steal a firearm from a seventeen year old youth. He and his co-assailants attacked the victim outside his residence. They beat him and stabbed him. Their victim died from his wounds. The appellant and his co-assailants then entered the victim’s home, pistol-whipped the victim’s mother, and searched the home for firearms. The appellant was charged with first degree murder. He was seventeen years old at the time of the offence and was tried before a jury in Youth Justice Court. He conceded at trial that he was guilty of manslaughter because he willingly participated in a planned robbery. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder. The Crown applied to have the appellant sentenced as an adult. The sentencing judge granted the application and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 10 years. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentencing decision. Argued Date 2024-10-15 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Young person sentenced as adult — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in sentencing a young person as an adult on the basis that Crown counsel rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Jennifer Pan, et al. (40839)

Armed men entered the home of Jennifer Pan and her parents. They shot and killed Mrs. Pan. They shot and seriously injured Mr. Pan. Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mylvaganam and Mr. Carty were charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. They were tried before a jury. Mid-trial, proceedings against Mr. Carty were severed. The jury convicted Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mylvaganam on both counts. They appealed from their convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from the convictions for the attempted murder of Mr. Pan. It allowed the appeals from the convictions for the first degree murder of Mrs. Pan and ordered a new trial in relation to her death. Argued Date 2024-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Evidence — Remitting counts for retrial — Jurors — What is the test for placing alternative theories of liability for a homicide to a jury, what deference is due to trial judge’s determination of whether an alternative has an air of reality, and whether the curative proviso ought to have been applied to decision not to put alternatives to the jury — Whether appellate courts should remit associated counts for retrial where doing otherwise risks inconsistent trial verdicts, whether the tainting doctrine is part of the test for remittance or for application of curative proviso, and which party bears the onus for establishing tainting and remittance — Scope of the trial judge’s duty in a multi-person complex prosecution to tailor to an accused instructions to the jury on use of evidence of a co-accused’s propensity for violence — Whether trial judge failed to properly assess evidence in considering reasonable apprehension of bias or appearance of unfairness arising from juror interference, sufficiency of inquiry into juror issues and deference due to trial judge’s decisions on juror issues — Admissibility and use of presentations summarizing evidence, what rules and procedural requirements apply to determine admissibility and use by a jury of aids summarizing evidence supporting Crown counsel’s case, and whether PowerPoint presentation supporting Crown counsel’s case was improperly allowed to go into jury room? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Jennifer Pan, et al. (40839)

Armed men entered the home of Jennifer Pan and her parents. They shot and killed Mrs. Pan. They shot and seriously injured Mr. Pan. Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mylvaganam and Mr. Carty were charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. They were tried before a jury. Mid-trial, proceedings against Mr. Carty were severed. The jury convicted Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mylvaganam on both counts. They appealed from their convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from the convictions for the attempted murder of Mr. Pan. It allowed the appeals from the convictions for the first degree murder of Mrs. Pan and ordered a new trial in relation to her death. Argued Date 2024-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Evidence — Remitting counts for retrial — Jurors — What is the test for placing alternative theories of liability for a homicide to a jury, what deference is due to trial judge’s determination of whether an alternative has an air of reality, and whether the curative proviso ought to have been applied to decision not to put alternatives to the jury — Whether appellate courts should remit associated counts for retrial where doing otherwise risks inconsistent trial verdicts, whether the tainting doctrine is part of the test for remittance or for application of curative proviso, and which party bears the onus for establishing tainting and remittance — Scope of the trial judge’s duty in a multi-person complex prosecution to tailor to an accused instructions to the jury on use of evidence of a co-accused’s propensity for violence — Whether trial judge failed to properly assess evidence in considering reasonable apprehension of bias or appearance of unfairness arising from juror interference, sufficiency of inquiry into juror issues and deference due to trial judge’s decisions on juror issues — Admissibility and use of presentations summarizing evidence, what rules and procedural requirements apply to determine admissibility and use by a jury of aids summarizing evidence supporting Crown counsel’s case, and whether PowerPoint presentation supporting Crown counsel’s case was improperly allowed to go into jury room? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Telus Communications Inc., et al. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, et al. (40776)

In February 2019, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC” or “Commission”), issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2019-57 for the purpose of initiating a broad review of mobile wireless services and their associated regulatory framework. The Commission indicated that the review would focus on three key areas, including the future of mobile wireless services in Canada, with a focus on reducing barriers to infrastructure deployment. In inviting comments on the matter, an access issue arose which asked whether the CRTC’s jurisdiction over access to municipal infrastructure extended to the installation of 5G small cells. This required the Commission to interpret the term “transmission line” in s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. The term “transmission line” is found in the Act’s access regime. The access regime authorizes carriers like the appellants to go onto public property to construct, maintain, or operate “transmission lines” with the consent of municipalities. Where terms of access cannot be agreed upon, s. 43(5) accords the CRTC the essentially adjudicative role of considering applications from, and providing redress to, public service providers who cannot gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission line on terms acceptable to them. In the CRTC’s view, “transmission line” could not include small cells or any technologies that transmit telecommunications wirelessly such that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes in this area by way of the access regime. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation, and dismissed the appeal brought by Telus Communications Inc. Argued Date 2024-10-16 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Boards and tribunals — Regulatory boards — Jurisdiction — Wireless services — Deployment of 5G network — Access regime to public and other property — Transmission lines — CRTC determining that it lacks jurisdiction over carriers’ access to municipal infrastructure for the installation of 5G small cells — Application of access regime to 5G small cells turning on interpretation of “transmission line” under Act — Does wireless transmission infrastructure (e.g., 5G small cells) constitute, or is it an integral part of, a “transmission line” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Telus Communications Inc., et al. v. Federation of Canadian Municipalities, et al. (40776)

In February 2019, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC” or “Commission”), issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2019-57 for the purpose of initiating a broad review of mobile wireless services and their associated regulatory framework. The Commission indicated that the review would focus on three key areas, including the future of mobile wireless services in Canada, with a focus on reducing barriers to infrastructure deployment. In inviting comments on the matter, an access issue arose which asked whether the CRTC’s jurisdiction over access to municipal infrastructure extended to the installation of 5G small cells. This required the Commission to interpret the term “transmission line” in s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. The term “transmission line” is found in the Act’s access regime. The access regime authorizes carriers like the appellants to go onto public property to construct, maintain, or operate “transmission lines” with the consent of municipalities. Where terms of access cannot be agreed upon, s. 43(5) accords the CRTC the essentially adjudicative role of considering applications from, and providing redress to, public service providers who cannot gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission line on terms acceptable to them. In the CRTC’s view, “transmission line” could not include small cells or any technologies that transmit telecommunications wirelessly such that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes in this area by way of the access regime. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation, and dismissed the appeal brought by Telus Communications Inc. Argued Date 2024-10-16 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Boards and tribunals — Regulatory boards — Jurisdiction — Wireless services — Deployment of 5G network — Access regime to public and other property — Transmission lines — CRTC determining that it lacks jurisdiction over carriers’ access to municipal infrastructure for the installation of 5G small cells — Application of access regime to 5G small cells turning on interpretation of “transmission line” under Act — Does wireless transmission infrastructure (e.g., 5G small cells) constitute, or is it an integral part of, a “transmission line” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).