Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Louis-Pier Senneville, et al. (40882)

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months’ imprisonment for possession and 11 months’ imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Louis-Pier Senneville, et al. (40882)

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months’ imprisonment for possession and 11 months’ imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikhail Kloubakov, et al. v. His Majesty the King (41017)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King’s Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikhail Kloubakov, et al. v. His Majesty the King (41017)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King’s Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Lundin Mining Corporation, et al. v. Dov Markowich (40853)

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario’s Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin’s alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin.Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin’s securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX.The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich’s action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin’s lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company’s failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Lundin Mining Corporation, et al. v. Dov Markowich (40853)

The respondent, Dov Markowich, is a shareholder of the appellant, Lundin Mining Corporation (“Lundin”). He sought leave under s. 138.8 of Ontario’s Securities Act, to bring a statutory cause of action against Lundin and its officers and directors for Lundin’s alleged failure to make timely disclosure of pit wall instability and a subsequent rockslide at a mine in Chile (“events”). He also sought to certify the action as a class action under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, advancing claims on behalf of certain shareholders of Lundin.Lundin did not publicly disclose the events at the time they occurred on October 25 and October 31, 2017, respectively. It advised investors about them approximately a month later, on November 29, in its regularly scheduled update. The next day, the price of Lundin’s securities fell 16 per cent on the TSX.The issue at the heart of the appeal involves the competing interpretations of whether there is a reasonable possibility that Mr. Markowich’s action will be resolved in his favour at trial based on his claim that Lundin’s lack of disclosure was contrary to its obligations to disclose forthwith a “material change” in its “business, operations or capital”. Argued Date 2025-01-15 Keywords Securities — Civil procedure — Commencement of proceedings — Statutory cause of action for failure to make timely disclosure — Leave to proceed — Mining company disclosing occurrence of pit wall instability and subsequent rockslide in periodic disclosure rather than at time of occurrence — Shareholder seeking to institute class action for company’s failure to make timely disclosure — Commencement of action requiring leave of the court based on whether there is reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved in favour of the plaintiff at trial — Motion judge dismissing motion for leave — Court of Appeal allowing appeal and granting motion for leave — What is a “material change” for the purpose of Canadian securities law? — Should the leave requirement modify or lessen the burden to show a “material change”? — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 138.3(4) and 138.8. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Paul Eric Wilson (40990)

Section 4.1(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, provides that no person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of the offence of simple possession of a controlled substance if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene of the medical emergency. Mr. Wilson was with three other people when one overdosed on fentanyl and one of them called 911. Police responding to the 911 call arrested Mr. Wilson for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose. Police conducted a search of the group’s truck and, in a green backpack, discovered modified handguns, parts for firearms, ammunition and identification papers. Later at a police station, Mr. Wilson admitted he was the owner of the green backpack, the guns and the ammunition. He admitted that the identification papers did not belong to him. Mr. Wilson was charged with possession of identity documents, fraudulent impersonation and a number of firearms offences. He was not charged with possession of a controlled substance. The trial judge dismissed an application for a declaration that the evidence should excluded for breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and admitted the evidence. Mr. Wilson was convicted of firearms offences. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and entered acquittals on all counts. Argued Date 2025-01-14 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Arbitrary detention — Good Samaritan law — Police responding to 911 call reporting an overdose and arresting accused for simple possession of a controlled substance at the scene of the overdose — Police conducting search incident to arrest and discovering evidence of firearms offences and false identity offences — Whether police had authority to arrest accused for simple possession of a controlled substance — Whether arrest and search were unlawful and in violation of Charter of Rights and Freedoms? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).