Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

His Majesty the King v. Lucas Hanrahan (41220)

The respondent was found not guilty of sexual assault following a jury trial. Consent was the central issue. The Crown appealed the respondent’s acquittal, submitting that the trial judge erred in law by restricting Crown counsel’s examination of the complainant on her prior statements (text messages that were exchanged between the complainant and the respondent after the event) and erred in law in rulings related to the admission of evidence about the complainant’s prior sexual history. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal. It concluded that although the trial judge placed restrictions on the text messages exhibit during direct examination of the complainant in excess of what was necessary to prevent the jury from improperly using the text messages, his interventions were within the reasonable exercise of his trial management power. The majority also concluded the trial judge made no error in finding that the prior sexual history evidence was capable of being admissible. There was no error regarding the judge’s finding of an inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence on cross-examination and her prior statement to the police. The trial judge did not err in admitting the prior sexual history evidence and in refusing to allow Crown counsel to question the complainant about the inconsistency on re-examination. Knickle J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the text messages conversation evidence and therefore improperly restricted the Crown’s direct examination of the complainant. The trial judge also erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual history for the purpose of cross-examining her on alleged inconsistencies, because the complainant’s testimony was not inconsistent with what she had stated to police and she had not put her previous sexual history with the respondent in issue. The trial judge also erred by denying Crown counsel’s re-examination of the complainant. These errors had a material bearing on the verdict of acquittal rendered by the jury. Argued Date 2025-01-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s prior sexual history — Text messages — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the prior sexual history evidence of the complainant was properly admitted by (i) deferring to the trial judge’s finding that there was an inconsistency; (ii) finding that the evidence met the threshold of legitimate relevance; and (iii) finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by prohibiting the Crown from asking the complainant questions on redirect about the prior sexual history — Whether the majority erred in holding that the trial judge’s restrictive treatment of text messages was a reasonable exercise of his trial management powers — Whether the errors had a material bearing on the acquittal and the test in R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, has been met — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Lucas Hanrahan (41220)

The respondent was found not guilty of sexual assault following a jury trial. Consent was the central issue. The Crown appealed the respondent’s acquittal, submitting that the trial judge erred in law by restricting Crown counsel’s examination of the complainant on her prior statements (text messages that were exchanged between the complainant and the respondent after the event) and erred in law in rulings related to the admission of evidence about the complainant’s prior sexual history. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown’s appeal. It concluded that although the trial judge placed restrictions on the text messages exhibit during direct examination of the complainant in excess of what was necessary to prevent the jury from improperly using the text messages, his interventions were within the reasonable exercise of his trial management power. The majority also concluded the trial judge made no error in finding that the prior sexual history evidence was capable of being admissible. There was no error regarding the judge’s finding of an inconsistency between the complainant’s evidence on cross-examination and her prior statement to the police. The trial judge did not err in admitting the prior sexual history evidence and in refusing to allow Crown counsel to question the complainant about the inconsistency on re-examination. Knickle J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his treatment of the text messages conversation evidence and therefore improperly restricted the Crown’s direct examination of the complainant. The trial judge also erred in admitting evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual history for the purpose of cross-examining her on alleged inconsistencies, because the complainant’s testimony was not inconsistent with what she had stated to police and she had not put her previous sexual history with the respondent in issue. The trial judge also erred by denying Crown counsel’s re-examination of the complainant. These errors had a material bearing on the verdict of acquittal rendered by the jury. Argued Date 2025-01-21 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s prior sexual history — Text messages — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the prior sexual history evidence of the complainant was properly admitted by (i) deferring to the trial judge’s finding that there was an inconsistency; (ii) finding that the evidence met the threshold of legitimate relevance; and (iii) finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by prohibiting the Crown from asking the complainant questions on redirect about the prior sexual history — Whether the majority erred in holding that the trial judge’s restrictive treatment of text messages was a reasonable exercise of his trial management powers — Whether the errors had a material bearing on the acquittal and the test in R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, has been met — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Wayne Lester Singer (41090)

On March 20, 2019, at approximately 11:00 p.m., police officers received a tip that Mr. Singer was driving a truck and the caller believed that he was intoxicated. More than an hour later, an officer observed a vehicle matching the vehicle description given by the caller. The truck was parked on a residential driveway. Its lights were on and its ignition was running. Officers could not see anyone in the vehicle from the road. They entered the driveway and approached the vehicle. They observed a single occupant sleeping in the driver’s seat. They knocked on the driver’s window and got no response. They opened the front doors and immediately smelled a strong odour of alcohol. The officers reached into the vehicle and shook Mr. Singer awake. Mr. Singer had red, bloodshot eyes and there was a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. Cst. Lapointe detained Mr. Singer and administered a roadside breath sample. Mr. Singer failed the roadside breath test. He was arrested for care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level. At a police station, he declined to provide a breath sample. Mr. Singer was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample made by a peace officer. At trial, Mr. Singer argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were breached and the evidence should be excluded. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted Mr. Singer of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample. The Court of Appeal held that the police officers’ conduct constituted a search in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2025-02-18 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Criminal law — Exclusion of evidence — Implied license to knock — Does the driver of a vehicle parked in the driveway of a dwelling house have a privacy interest protected by s. 8 of the Charter such that police officers responding to a complaint of impaired driving are prohibited from approaching the vehicle, communicating with the driver and observing signs of impairment — If the police conducted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, was that search unreasonable — If the police conducted an unreasonable search, should the evidence obtained from the search be excluded? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Wayne Lester Singer (41090)

On March 20, 2019, at approximately 11:00 p.m., police officers received a tip that Mr. Singer was driving a truck and the caller believed that he was intoxicated. More than an hour later, an officer observed a vehicle matching the vehicle description given by the caller. The truck was parked on a residential driveway. Its lights were on and its ignition was running. Officers could not see anyone in the vehicle from the road. They entered the driveway and approached the vehicle. They observed a single occupant sleeping in the driver’s seat. They knocked on the driver’s window and got no response. They opened the front doors and immediately smelled a strong odour of alcohol. The officers reached into the vehicle and shook Mr. Singer awake. Mr. Singer had red, bloodshot eyes and there was a strong odour of alcohol coming from his breath. Cst. Lapointe detained Mr. Singer and administered a roadside breath sample. Mr. Singer failed the roadside breath test. He was arrested for care or control of a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol level. At a police station, he declined to provide a breath sample. Mr. Singer was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample made by a peace officer. At trial, Mr. Singer argued that his s. 8 Charter rights were breached and the evidence should be excluded. The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted Mr. Singer of failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample. The Court of Appeal held that the police officers’ conduct constituted a search in breach of s. 8 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, excluded the evidence and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2025-02-18 Keywords Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Search and seizure — Criminal law — Exclusion of evidence — Implied license to knock — Does the driver of a vehicle parked in the driveway of a dwelling house have a privacy interest protected by s. 8 of the Charter such that police officers responding to a complaint of impaired driving are prohibited from approaching the vehicle, communicating with the driver and observing signs of impairment — If the police conducted a search within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter, was that search unreasonable — If the police conducted an unreasonable search, should the evidence obtained from the search be excluded? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia v. Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia (Day 2/2) (41061)

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-12 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia v. Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia (Day 2/2) (41061)

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-12 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia v. Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia (Day 1/2) (41061)

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-11 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Kuldeep Kaur Ahluwalia v. Amrit Pal Singh Ahluwalia (Day 1/2) (41061)

The parties were married in 1999 in India. During their sixteen years of marriage, they had two children. The trial judge found that Mr. Ahluwalia was abusive during the marriage. The trial judge accepted Ms. Ahluwalia’s evidence that the parties’ relationship was characterized by a pattern of emotional and physical abuse and financial control. Ms. Ahluwalia testified to three specific incidents of physical violence: in 2000, 2008, and 2013. Ms. Ahluwalia brought an action for statutory relief and also claimed damages for Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct during the marriage. Justice Mandhane, the trial judge, awarded Ms. Ahluwalia $100,000 in compensatory and aggravated damages for the new tort of family violence. She also awarded an additional $50,000 in punitive damages for a total of $150,000 in damages. Benotto J.A., for the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal in part and reduced the damage award by $50,000. The Court of Appeal declined to recognize the new torts of domestic violence or coercive control as defined in this case. Argued Date 2025-02-11 Keywords Family law – Tort of family violence – Was Justice Mandhane correct in recognizing a tort of family violence? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ville de Sainte-Julie v. Investissements Laroda Inc. (41036)

In the 1990s, Promotion M.G. Larochelle inc. (Promotion M.G.) was involved in real estate development in Ville de Sainte-Julie (City), the applicant/cross respondent. In December 2000, the total area of Promotion M.G.’s real estate projects was 760,926.3 m2. The municipal by law on parks and playgrounds required 76,092.63 m2, that is, 10% of that area, to be transferred free of charge to the City. However, Promotion M.G. had already transferred 3,898.27 m2 in excess to the City. In February 2001, the City and Promotion M.G. signed an agreement (Agreement) regarding land transfers for the purposes of parks or playgrounds. The Agreement included an undertaking by Promotion M.G. to transfer land with an area of 45,615 m2 to the City, 50% of that area (22,807.5 m2) being applicable, along with the 3,898.27 m2 already transferred in excess, to the creation of a total [TRANSLATION] “area bank” of 26,705.78 m2. The creation of that bank allowed the City to avoid having to compensate Promotion M.G. in money for the excess area transferred. In fact, the parties expressly agreed that the bank was to be applied in compensation for park fees to be paid to the City in the context of future real estate development by Promotion M.G. or companies related to it in the City. While at the time Promotion M.G. did not have any land to develop in the City, a company related to it, the respondent/cross applicant, Les Investissements Laroda inc. (Laroda), owned lots located in an agricultural zone that it intended to develop for real estate purposes. On two occasions, that is, in 2004 and 2008, the City filed an application with the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec (CPTAQ) to have part of the sector (called “Du Moulin”) where Lorada’s lots were located excluded from the agricultural zone, and each time, the application was rejected. The Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissed the appeal from CPTAQ’s last decision in 2011. In December 2015, Laroda, which, since 2010, had had all the rights, titles and interest that belonged to Promotion M.G., sent a letter, through its representative, Éric Larochelle, to the City’s mayor requesting that she make it a monetary offer that corresponded to the present value of the area included in the bank provided for in the Agreement. After talks broke down, Laroda filed an originating application against the City asking the court to fix a term for the Agreement and to order the City to pay damages. The Superior Court dismissed the originating application and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-02-17 Keywords Contract — Transaction — Novation — Modalities of obligation — Compensatory prestation — Prescription of right of action — Insofar as Agreement P 5 dated February 19, 2001, constitutes transaction, whether Court of Appeal erred in not finding it to have novatory if not declaratory nature that modified pre existing obligations of parties — Whether Court of Appeal could order restitution of prestations where no situation set out in art. 1699 of Civil Code of Québec was alleged or proven and where parties had signed notarial acts by which Les Investissements Laroda transferred surplus parks free of charge — Whether Court of Appeal, in interpreting Agreement P-5, erred in characterizing City’s obligation to reimburse as being obligation with term; if not, whether it could simultaneously apply arts. 1510 and 1512 of Civil Code of Québec with direct effect on prescriptive period — Whether Court of Appeal erred in failing to apply performance by equivalence regime in context of this case after having previously recognized that City’s obligation had become exigible — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1497, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1660, 1699, 1700, 2631, 2925. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Ville de Sainte-Julie v. Investissements Laroda Inc. (41036)

In the 1990s, Promotion M.G. Larochelle inc. (Promotion M.G.) was involved in real estate development in Ville de Sainte-Julie (City), the applicant/cross respondent. In December 2000, the total area of Promotion M.G.’s real estate projects was 760,926.3 m2. The municipal by law on parks and playgrounds required 76,092.63 m2, that is, 10% of that area, to be transferred free of charge to the City. However, Promotion M.G. had already transferred 3,898.27 m2 in excess to the City. In February 2001, the City and Promotion M.G. signed an agreement (Agreement) regarding land transfers for the purposes of parks or playgrounds. The Agreement included an undertaking by Promotion M.G. to transfer land with an area of 45,615 m2 to the City, 50% of that area (22,807.5 m2) being applicable, along with the 3,898.27 m2 already transferred in excess, to the creation of a total [TRANSLATION] “area bank” of 26,705.78 m2. The creation of that bank allowed the City to avoid having to compensate Promotion M.G. in money for the excess area transferred. In fact, the parties expressly agreed that the bank was to be applied in compensation for park fees to be paid to the City in the context of future real estate development by Promotion M.G. or companies related to it in the City. While at the time Promotion M.G. did not have any land to develop in the City, a company related to it, the respondent/cross applicant, Les Investissements Laroda inc. (Laroda), owned lots located in an agricultural zone that it intended to develop for real estate purposes. On two occasions, that is, in 2004 and 2008, the City filed an application with the Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec (CPTAQ) to have part of the sector (called “Du Moulin”) where Lorada’s lots were located excluded from the agricultural zone, and each time, the application was rejected. The Administrative Tribunal of Québec dismissed the appeal from CPTAQ’s last decision in 2011. In December 2015, Laroda, which, since 2010, had had all the rights, titles and interest that belonged to Promotion M.G., sent a letter, through its representative, Éric Larochelle, to the City’s mayor requesting that she make it a monetary offer that corresponded to the present value of the area included in the bank provided for in the Agreement. After talks broke down, Laroda filed an originating application against the City asking the court to fix a term for the Agreement and to order the City to pay damages. The Superior Court dismissed the originating application and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Argued Date 2025-02-17 Keywords Contract — Transaction — Novation — Modalities of obligation — Compensatory prestation — Prescription of right of action — Insofar as Agreement P 5 dated February 19, 2001, constitutes transaction, whether Court of Appeal erred in not finding it to have novatory if not declaratory nature that modified pre existing obligations of parties — Whether Court of Appeal could order restitution of prestations where no situation set out in art. 1699 of Civil Code of Québec was alleged or proven and where parties had signed notarial acts by which Les Investissements Laroda transferred surplus parks free of charge — Whether Court of Appeal, in interpreting Agreement P-5, erred in characterizing City’s obligation to reimburse as being obligation with term; if not, whether it could simultaneously apply arts. 1510 and 1512 of Civil Code of Québec with direct effect on prescriptive period — Whether Court of Appeal erred in failing to apply performance by equivalence regime in context of this case after having previously recognized that City’s obligation had become exigible — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 1497, 1508, 1510, 1512, 1660, 1699, 1700, 2631, 2925. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).