Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah v. Attorney General of Canada (41132)

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah v. Attorney General of Canada (41132)

In 2019, Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah both applied for transfer to a minimum security institution. At the time, Mr. Dorsey, a dangerous offender, was incarcerated at a medium security facility; Mr. Salah was sentenced to concurrent life sentences and is incarcerated at a different medium security facility. Mr. Dorsey’s case management team, his Manager of Assessment and Intervention, and his Warden all agreed that he met the criteria for reclassification to minimum security but, because of his dangerous offender status, his transfer request had to be approved by the Regional Deputy Commissioner and then the Assistant Commissioner of Correctional Operations and Programs. In September 2019, the Regional Deputy Commissioner assessed Mr. Dorsey’s public safety rating as moderate. His request was denied.Mr. Salah’s case management team, his parole officer, and his Manager of Assessment and Intervention recommended reclassification and transfer to a minimum security facility, but, in October 2019, a new Manager of Assessment and Intervention and Intervention was assigned to his file. He assessed Mr. Salah as a moderate escape risk, so the Warden wrongly denied his transfer request.Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah each applied under the Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-1, for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid. Although they did not apply under the Charter, they alleged that the denial of their transfer requests engaged ss. 7, 9, 10(c) and 12 of the Charter. On consent, the applications were joined for the purpose of determining a common threshold legal issue: whether Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Salah could resort to habeas corpus to challenge the denials of their applications for transfer to lower security prisons.The applications were dismissed on the grounds that habeas corpus was not available for denials of reclassification, which were not deprivations of residual liberty. After the application judge’s decision, Mr. Dorsey was reclassified and transferred to a minimum security institution, but he continued his appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2025-05-13 Keywords Prerogative writs — Habeas corpus — Prisons — Deprivation of residual liberty — Security classification — Transfer — Denial of reclassification — Denial of transfer to lower security institution — Whether denial of reclassification and transfer to lower security institution is deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Sharon Fox (41215)

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Sharon Fox (41215)

The respondent is a criminal defence lawyer whose client was the subject of a wiretap authorization under the Criminal Code. The authorization did not permit live monitoring of phone calls with a lawyer; such calls could be recorded, but a judge’s order was required to access them. During the surveillance operation, the respondent called her client, which was automatically recorded. A civilian employee also listened to a portion of the call before disconnecting.A reviewing judge concluded that an initial portion of the telephone call was not subject to solicitor-client privilege and it was released to the Crown. The recording revealed the respondent informed her client that a third party had been arrested and that the police would likely be obtaining search warrants for places where the third party had been. The respondent was charged with wilfully attempting to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice by interfering in an ongoing police investigation, contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the respondent’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter were not breached with respect to the civilian employee listening to her phone conversation. However, she also concluded that her rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter had been breached due to her inability to access the second, privileged portion of the recording. She ordered the entire recording excluded under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Crown called no evidence and the respondent was acquitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the acquittal and the trial judge’s decision with respect to the breaches of the respondent’s rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. However, it also concluded that her rights under s. 8 had been breached, and it therefore would have excluded the evidence of the telephone call under s. 24(2) of the Charter rather than s. 24(1). The dissenting judge would have held that the respondent’s ss. 7 and 11(d) rights were not breached. He agreed with the majority that there was a breach of her s. 8 rights, but he would have held that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2). He would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2025-05-20 Keywords Criminal Law — Charter of rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Full answer and defence (ss. 7 and 11(d) — Solicitor-client privilege — Wire-tap authorization — Interaction between solicitor-client privilege and an accused’s lawyer’s Charter rights — Wire-tap monitoring and recording of phone call between defence counsel and client — Whether the respondent’s right to make full answer and defence was breached by not having access to the full recording of a phone call protected by solicitor-client privilege — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Quebec v. Bijou Cibuabua Kanyinda (Day 2/2) (41210)

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Quebec v. Bijou Cibuabua Kanyinda (Day 2/2) (41210)

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-15 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Quebec v. Bijou Cibuabua Kanyinda (Day 1/2) (41210)

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Quebec v. Bijou Cibuabua Kanyinda (Day 1/2) (41210)

The respondent Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda entered Quebec on or about October 9, 2018, via Roxham Road following a stay in the United States. Originally from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda made a claim for refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, when she arrived. She has three children, who accompanied her and were very young at the time the application was filed. During the waiting period for the processing of her claim for refugee status, which was lengthy, she obtained a work permit allowing her to work in Quebec, and she approached three childcare facilities to find subsidized spaces for the children. However, she was denied access to subsidized childcare because such childcare is reserved for those whose refugee status is formally recognized by the federal authorities, which excludes those waiting for a decision in this regard. On May 31, 2019, Ms. Cibuabua Kanyinda filed an application for judicial review, which was amended on August 16, 2019. In the application, she challenged the legality, on the basis of an absence of valid statutory authorization, and the constitutional validity, on the basis of an infringement of certain rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter, of s. 3 of the Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1. Argued Date 2025-05-14 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to equality — Discrimination based on sex — Disproportionate impact of exclusion from subsidized childcare on women claiming refugee protection who have obtained work permit ? Whether s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation infringes right to equality protected by s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter — If so, whether this infringement is justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter — If this Court were to find that s. 3 of Reduced Contribution Regulation unjustifiably infringes s. 15(1) of Canadian Charter, what should appropriate remedy be? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15(1) — Reduced Contribution Regulation, CQLR, c. S 4.1.1, r. 1, s. 3. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tony Rousselle v. His Majesty the King (41153)

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Tony Rousselle v. His Majesty the King (41153)

Mr. Rousselle was arrested for impaired driving and administered a breathalyser test. Based on the results of the test, he was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours of ceasing to operate a motor vehicle. At trial, a Certificate of Qualified Technician from the officer who administered the breathalyzer test was admitted into evidence but the trial judge refused to admit two certificates of analysts who had certified the target value of the alcohol standard used by the qualified technician to conduct a required system calibration check of the breathalyzer device. The trial judge held the Certificate of Qualified Technician was not evidence of the target value of an alcohol standard and proof of the target value of an alcohol standard was a pre-condition to the Crown relying on the presumption in s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code that breathalyzer test results are conclusive proof of blood alcohol concentration. The trial judge acquitted Mr. Rousselle. A summary conviction appeal was allowed, the acquittal was set aside and a conviction was entered. The Court of appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2025-04-24 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Breathalyser test results — Target value of alcohol standard — Whether Court of Appeal erred in interpretation of s. 320.31(1)(a) of Criminal Code as permitting Crown to prove alcohol standard was certified by an analyst through hearsay evidence of qualified technician? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).