Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

His Majesty the King v. Enrico Di Paola (40777)

The respondent, Enrico Di-Paola, is a construction contractor committed for trial on four charges related to a corruption and fraud matter involving an official with whom he was doing business and with whom he had a friendship. The day before his trial, Mr. Di-Paola entered into a negotiated agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty to a charge of having conferred a benefit on an official while having dealings with the government and without the written consent of the official’s superior (s. 121(1)(b)), and the prosecutor dropped the more serious charges. The prosecutor amended the indictment in accordance with the agreement. Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Di-Paola. The judge accepted as one of the aggravating factors the fact that Mr. Di-Paola had conferred advantages and benefits on the official in consideration of the awarding of lucrative contracts by the official. The Court of Appeal reduced the length of the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed on Mr. Di-Paola from 15 months to 6 months, finding that the trial judge had erred in principle in accepting aggravating facts associated with another charge that had previously been laid and that had not been carried over in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties. Argued Date 2025-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Consideration of facts forming part of circumstances of offence — Agreement entered into by prosecutor and accused regarding guilty plea — Whether evidence of facts that demonstrate offence with which offender was initially charged, but which is no longer pending and for which there was no verdict, is admissible as aggravating factor for sentencing pursuant to s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code — What are duties of fairness of prosecutor who intends to use s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code to prove such offence as aggravating factor in sentencing following guilty plea? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 725(1)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

His Majesty the King v. Enrico Di Paola (40777)

The respondent, Enrico Di-Paola, is a construction contractor committed for trial on four charges related to a corruption and fraud matter involving an official with whom he was doing business and with whom he had a friendship. The day before his trial, Mr. Di-Paola entered into a negotiated agreement with the prosecutor to plead guilty to a charge of having conferred a benefit on an official while having dealings with the government and without the written consent of the official’s superior (s. 121(1)(b)), and the prosecutor dropped the more serious charges. The prosecutor amended the indictment in accordance with the agreement. Following the guilty plea, the Superior Court imposed a 15-month conditional sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Di-Paola. The judge accepted as one of the aggravating factors the fact that Mr. Di-Paola had conferred advantages and benefits on the official in consideration of the awarding of lucrative contracts by the official. The Court of Appeal reduced the length of the conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed on Mr. Di-Paola from 15 months to 6 months, finding that the trial judge had erred in principle in accepting aggravating facts associated with another charge that had previously been laid and that had not been carried over in accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties. Argued Date 2025-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Consideration of facts forming part of circumstances of offence — Agreement entered into by prosecutor and accused regarding guilty plea — Whether evidence of facts that demonstrate offence with which offender was initially charged, but which is no longer pending and for which there was no verdict, is admissible as aggravating factor for sentencing pursuant to s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code — What are duties of fairness of prosecutor who intends to use s. 725(1)(c) of Criminal Code to prove such offence as aggravating factor in sentencing following guilty plea? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 725(1)(c). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Awale Hussein v. His Majesty the King (41015)

After friends spent a night drinking heavily in a basement apartment, Mr. Boucher was fatally stabbed multiple times in a bedroom. No one witnessed the stabbing. Mr. Hussein was charged with second degree murder and tried before a jury. He testified at trial. Defence counsel brought an application to prevent or restrict the Crown from cross-examining Mr. Hussein on his extensive criminal record. The trial judge dismissed the application. In cross-examination of Mr. Hussein, Crown counsel raised his criminal record. The trial judge instructed the jury on the use it could make of Mr. Hussein’s criminal record. The jury convicted Mr. Hussein of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the conviction. Argued Date 2025-01-23 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Prior convictions — Should the test for admitting a testifying accused’s criminal record into evidence at trial be modified and if so, what is the appropriate test — Whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the accused’s criminal record? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Awale Hussein v. His Majesty the King (41015)

After friends spent a night drinking heavily in a basement apartment, Mr. Boucher was fatally stabbed multiple times in a bedroom. No one witnessed the stabbing. Mr. Hussein was charged with second degree murder and tried before a jury. He testified at trial. Defence counsel brought an application to prevent or restrict the Crown from cross-examining Mr. Hussein on his extensive criminal record. The trial judge dismissed the application. In cross-examination of Mr. Hussein, Crown counsel raised his criminal record. The trial judge instructed the jury on the use it could make of Mr. Hussein’s criminal record. The jury convicted Mr. Hussein of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the conviction. Argued Date 2025-01-23 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Prior convictions — Should the test for admitting a testifying accused’s criminal record into evidence at trial be modified and if so, what is the appropriate test — Whether the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the accused’s criminal record? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Louis-Pier Senneville, et al. (40882)

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months’ imprisonment for possession and 11 months’ imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Attorney General of Québec, et al. v. Louis-Pier Senneville, et al. (40882)

The appellants, the Attorney General of Quebec and His Majesty the King, obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the declaration of unconstitutionality made by the Quebec Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 with respect to the mandatory minimum sentences of 12 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code. According to the majority of the Court of Appeal, these provisions violate s. 12 of the Canadian Charter, namely, the guarantee provided against cruel and unusual punishment, and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter. That declaration of unconstitutionality resulted from appeals filed notably in respect of two decisions rendered by the Court of Québec regarding the sentences to be imposed on the respondents, Mr. Naud and Mr. Senneville. Mr. Naud was convicted of two counts relating to possession and distribution of child pornography. Sentences of 9 months’ imprisonment for possession and 11 months’ imprisonment for distribution pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (3) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, along with various consequential orders. Mr. Senneville was convicted of two counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography. Sentences of 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for possession and 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently for accessing child pornography pursuant to s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code were imposed on him, also along with various consequential orders. Argued Date 2025-01-20 Keywords Charter of Rights — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — One-year minimum sentences — Child pornography — Counts relating to possessing and accessing child pornography — Whether s. 163.1(4)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether s. 163.1(4.1)(a) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, violates s. 12 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If it does, whether it is reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 12 and 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1(4)(a) and (4.1)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikhail Kloubakov, et al. v. His Majesty the King (41017)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King’s Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mikhail Kloubakov, et al. v. His Majesty the King (41017)

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Following their trial, the appellants, Mikhail Kloubakov and Hicham Moustaine, were convicted of obtaining a material benefit from sexual services (s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code) and of procuring, as parties (s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code). However, after entering the convictions, the trial judge determined that the provisions in question were overbroad and that they deprived certain sex workers of the right to security without being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, thereby infringing s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. She held that the infringements were not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and she accordingly declared ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) unconstitutional and suspended the declaration of invalidity for 30 days. She entered a stay of proceedings as a remedy. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the declarations of invalidity concerning ss. 286.2 and 286.3 and the stay of proceedings, and entered convictions against Mr. Kloubakov and Mr. Moustaine. It referred the matter back to the Court of King’s Bench for sentencing. In its view, the impugned provisions did not infringe s. 7, and a s. 1 analysis was therefore unnecessary. Argued Date 2024-11-12 Keywords Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of person — Criminal law — Commodification of sexual activities — Accused challenging constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions concerning offence of obtaining material benefit from sexual services and offence of procuring — Whether Court of Appeal erred in determining purpose of legislation and of relevant provisions — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that provisions were not overbroad in relation to their purpose, contrary to s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether it is possible to displace presumption that purposes articulated by Parliament are valid — If it is possible, whether presumption is displaced in this case — Whether ss. 286.2(1), (4) and (5) and 286.3(1) of Criminal Code infringe rights guaranteed in s. 7 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If so, whether these infringements can be justified under s. 1 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — If infringements are not justified under s. 1, what remedies are most appropriate in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 286.2, 286.3. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Pawel Kosicki, et al. v. City of Toronto, Formerly the Corporation of the Borough of York (40908)

The appellants are owners of a residential property in the City of Toronto. They sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of City parkland that their predecessors in title had fenced off with a chain link fence and enclosed into their backyard. The City acknowledged that the appellants’ evidence satisfied the traditional test for adverse possession. The issue was whether the disputed land was nevertheless immune to a claim for adverse possession by virtue of being City land. The application judge found that a private landowner could not acquire title by encroaching on public land and fencing off portions for their private use. This decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2025-01-16 Keywords Courts — Jurisdiction — Property — Real property — Adverse possession — Home owner fencing off part of municipal parkland for their own use and subsequent owners seeking to acquire that land by way of a claim for adverse possession — Does the statutory scheme or existing case law support the Court of Appeal’s decision to exempt municipal parkland from the real property limitations legislation? — Did the Court of Appeal have the jurisdiction to use the common law to provide that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from the real property limitations legislation? — If so, was it appropriate for the Court of Appeal to amend the law of adverse possession to find that municipal parkland is exempt or immune from claims of adverse possession? — Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, ss. 4, 15, 16. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).