Supreme Court of Canada Hearings

R.A. v. His Majesty the King (41421)

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

R.A. v. His Majesty the King (41421)

In 1978, the appellant, R.A., was babysitting the then five-year-old complainant at his home. In a statement made to the police, he explained that he asked the complainant to touch him and she did so. The appellant was charged with one count of indecently assaulting the complainant contrary to s. 149 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Following a trial in the Provincial Court, the appellant was acquitted on the basis that there had been no “assault” under the Criminal Code. There had been no direct, intentional application of force to the complainant and no attempt or threat by an act or gesture to apply force to the complainant.On appeal, the Crown submitted that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the elements of assault and holding that the sexual touching had to be physically initiated by the accused. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the acquittal. It concluded that the appellant touched the complainant in a manner constituting an assault and that any intentional contact with a child by an adult that is committed in circumstances of a sexual nature constitutes a direct and intentional application of force by the adult to the child’s person, regardless of whose physical movement initiated the contact. Considering that the only issue was whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to an assault and that the question had been answered in the affirmative, the court entered a conviction for indecent assault and remitted the matter to the Provincial Court for the appellant to be sentenced. Argued Date 2025-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Indecent assault — Elements of offence — Intentional application of force — Did the Court of Appeal for British Columbia err in holding that in order to ground the offence of indecent assault in 1978, the element of assault did not require the intentional application of force by an accused? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 149. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Amari Donawa v. His Majesty the King (41287)

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Amari Donawa v. His Majesty the King (41287)

During a roadside stop, the police found a handgun in the fanny pack belonging to the appellant, Mr. Amari Donawa. The handgun was sent to the Centre of Forensic Sciences, but for reasons that were not explained, the police did not send the magazine or the ammunition.At trial, the expert testified that the handgun could not be fired easily without the magazine. The trial judge, Justice Edward of the Ontario Court of Justice, found that the handgun was not a firearm because making it operational, according to the expert, required special expertise, considerable time, and part not readily available. The Crown appealed Mr. Donawa’s acquittals entered by the trial judge on the various firearm offences. The central issue in the appeal was whether the trial judge was correct in his finding that the handgun was not a firearm as defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and set aside the acquittals. It entered convictions on two counts (careless storage of a firearm and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number) and ordered a new trial on other counts. In its view, the trial judge made a number of errors in reaching his conclusion. He failed to consider whether the handgun, as found, was operable, based on the evidence. The failure to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence was an error of law. Argued Date 2025-03-26 Keywords Criminal Law —Firearm — Definition of firearm in Criminal Code — Evidence — Assessment — Does the definition of a “firearm” under s. 2 of the Criminal Code always dispense with proof of the availability of a functional magazine? — Did the Court of Appeal for Ontario err in finding that the trial judge had failed to consider all of the evidence in relation to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 2 “firearm”. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Louis-Victor Sylvestre, et al. (41131)

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mohawk Council of Kanesatake v. Louis-Victor Sylvestre, et al. (41131)

The respondents are various professionals who obtained judgments against the appellant in 2004, to which a ten-year prescriptive period applies under art. 2924 of the Civil Code of Québec. Certain actions interrupted prescription between 2005 and 2007, after which prescription started running again.A bailiff served a notice of execution on the appellant in 2016, which authorized the bailiff to seize the appellant’s movable property. However, the bailiff concluded that the appellant’s movable property was exempt from seizure pursuant to section 89 of the Indian Act. The bailiff later had discussions with the appellant’s Grand Chief and was informed that there was no property outside of its land base. The bailiff did not prepare and file minutes of seizure. Subsequently, the appellant informed the respondents that it held a property outside of its land base but that it was exempt from seizure. The respondents registered a legal hypothec against that property.The appellant sought a declaration that the prescriptive period applicable to the judgment had expired before the respondents registered the hypothec. The trial judge concluded that prescription had been interrupted in November 2016 when the respondents served a notice of execution on the appellant. The actions of the respondents amounted to a judicial application that interrupted prescription per article 2892 C.C.Q. Although the seizure was unfruitful, it had not been dismissed or annulled by a court, in which case prescription would not have been interrupted, per article 2894 C.C.Q. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial judge’s decision. Argued Date 2025-03-19 Keywords Prescription — Extinctive prescription — Interruption of prescription — Whether service of notice of execution interrupted prescription — Whether service of notice of execution amounts to unsuccessful seizure if there are no assets available to seize — Whether section 89 of the Indian Act applies so as to render appellant’s movable property unseizable — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 2892, 2894 — Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 89. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen Emond and Claudette Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Company (41077)

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Stephen Emond and Claudette Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Company (41077)

Stephen and Claudette Emond lived in a home on the Ottawa River that was located in the catchment area of the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority (“MVCA”). They had purchased a standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy from Trillium Mutual Insurance Company. The Emonds’ home was deemed a total loss as a result of flooding in April 2019. Although the insurer acknowledged coverage for the loss under the policy, the parties could not agree on what, if any, costs of replacement of the insureds’ home were excluded from coverage under the policy. The Emonds claimed that the Guaranteed Rebuilding Cost (“GRC”) coverage endorsement fully guaranteed their rebuilding costs. Trillium acknowledged that the GRC coverage applied to replace the insureds’ home, but took the position that the costs to be incurred to comply with the MVCA’s regulation policies and other by-laws and regulations enacted after the original building of the home were excluded from coverage by an exclusion in the policy. The application judge accepted the Emonds’ position that the GRC coverage was intended to guarantee the costs of rebuilding their home, without any limitation of coverage resulting from the operation of any rule, regulation, by-law, or ordinance. The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the insurer’s appeal and concluded that the exclusion applied to exclude coverage for increased costs to comply with any law, including by-laws and regulations such as the MVCA regulation policies. Argued Date 2025-03-18 Keywords Insurance — Homeowner’s insurance — Home deemed total loss as a result of flooding — Home insured through standard form residential homeowners’ insurance policy including endorsement for guaranteed rebuilding cost — Policy containing exclusion for increased costs of replacement due to operation of any law regulating construction of buildings — Insurer disputing homeowners’ claim for coverage for costs of complying with regulatory policies to rebuild home — Application judge concluding coverage included and Court of Appeal concluding coverage excluded — What is the correct interpretation of the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement? — Whether an exclusion clause in the basic policy can be used to deny expanded coverage granted by the guaranteed rebuilding cost endorsement. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Frédéric Rioux v. His Majesty the King (41362)

Judge Gagnon of the Court of Québec acquitted the appellant, Frédéric Rioux, of the offence of sexual assault committed between August 1 and 2, 2019, in Bonsecours. Although the Crown had laid only one charge for a sexual assault that occurred in Bonsecours, the Crown’s evidence related to two instances of sexual intercourse, one in Magog and the other in Bonsecours. With regard to the first sexual act, which took place in a park in Magog, the judge found that the accused’s evidence was probative of the complainant’s consent and had not been contradicted by the complainant, who had no memory of the incident. The actus reus was therefore not established beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the second instance of sexual intercourse, which occurred at the accused’s house in Bonsecours, the judge found that the Crown had met its burden but that Mr. Rioux’s version raised a doubt concerning his honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s consent.For the reasons given by Bachand J.A. and concurred in by Hamilton J.A., the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial, but only with respect to Mr. Rioux’s criminal liability for the events that took place in the park in Magog on the evening of August 1, 2019, since the Crown had decided not to challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Rioux had no criminally liability for the events in Bonsecours. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had made errors of law in analyzing the issue of the complainant’s capacity to consent to the sexual acts that had taken place in Magog. Those errors of law on the issue of the consensual nature of the sexual acts made it necessary to hold a new trial. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, as he was of the view that the trial judge had considered all the circumstantial evidence but had found that Mr. Rioux could nevertheless be acquitted based on the probative value of his testimony. Mainville J.A. expressed serious reservations about the validity of the Crown’s appeal with regard to events that were not part of the charge, given that the accused had been acquitted of the offence directly covered by the indictment. He added that it was not appropriate to order a new trial when Mr. Rioux would be tried again for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted. Argued Date 2025-01-22 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Capacity to consent — Absence of direct evidence from complainant — Consideration of all evidence — Appeal — Powers of Court of Appeal — Charge — Order limiting scope of new trial — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had failed to consider all evidence on ultimate issue of guilt or innocence — If trial judge made error of law, whether majority erred in law in failing to address question of whether respondent had shown with reasonable degree of certainty that verdict would not necessarily have been same without that error in light of trial judge’s conclusion that he believed appellant. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Frédéric Rioux v. His Majesty the King (41362)

Judge Gagnon of the Court of Québec acquitted the appellant, Frédéric Rioux, of the offence of sexual assault committed between August 1 and 2, 2019, in Bonsecours. Although the Crown had laid only one charge for a sexual assault that occurred in Bonsecours, the Crown’s evidence related to two instances of sexual intercourse, one in Magog and the other in Bonsecours. With regard to the first sexual act, which took place in a park in Magog, the judge found that the accused’s evidence was probative of the complainant’s consent and had not been contradicted by the complainant, who had no memory of the incident. The actus reus was therefore not established beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the second instance of sexual intercourse, which occurred at the accused’s house in Bonsecours, the judge found that the Crown had met its burden but that Mr. Rioux’s version raised a doubt concerning his honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s consent.For the reasons given by Bachand J.A. and concurred in by Hamilton J.A., the Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial, but only with respect to Mr. Rioux’s criminal liability for the events that took place in the park in Magog on the evening of August 1, 2019, since the Crown had decided not to challenge the trial judge’s conclusion that Mr. Rioux had no criminally liability for the events in Bonsecours. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had made errors of law in analyzing the issue of the complainant’s capacity to consent to the sexual acts that had taken place in Magog. Those errors of law on the issue of the consensual nature of the sexual acts made it necessary to hold a new trial. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, as he was of the view that the trial judge had considered all the circumstantial evidence but had found that Mr. Rioux could nevertheless be acquitted based on the probative value of his testimony. Mainville J.A. expressed serious reservations about the validity of the Crown’s appeal with regard to events that were not part of the charge, given that the accused had been acquitted of the offence directly covered by the indictment. He added that it was not appropriate to order a new trial when Mr. Rioux would be tried again for an offence of which he had been finally acquitted. Argued Date 2025-01-22 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Capacity to consent — Absence of direct evidence from complainant — Consideration of all evidence — Appeal — Powers of Court of Appeal — Charge — Order limiting scope of new trial — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had failed to consider all evidence on ultimate issue of guilt or innocence — If trial judge made error of law, whether majority erred in law in failing to address question of whether respondent had shown with reasonable degree of certainty that verdict would not necessarily have been same without that error in light of trial judge’s conclusion that he believed appellant. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).